

# CROWN-RANGATIRATANGA RELATIONS IN THE 20TH CENTURY


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## *ORIGINS OF PROJECT*

The publication of the illustrated book, launched exactly a month ago, has prompted the timing of this seminar. In Dick Scott's recent autobiography he says, with reference to another of his books on a major incident during New Zealand's rule of Niue after the war: 'This book did not come from nowhere.'<sup>1</sup> He was referring to his political and intellectual involvement in the troubled time of the early 1950s. For Scott, 'history has served as a vehicle for delivering political, economic and moral judgement', with a view to improving the lot of the dispossessed.'<sup>2</sup>



## *TYPES OF HISTORY*

This made me think that I should begin this seminar with some reflection on how I came to be writing on Crown-Maori relations. I will start first of all by stressing that I am essentially an historian of the New Zealand state and its activities. While I find that subject intrinsically interesting – far more exciting than it sounds! – I've also made the point elsewhere that I would not have been an historian if I thought that uncovering the past had nothing to do with the present and the future. So while I am not a proselytising historian, as Scott proclaims he is, and I have not joined the ranks of those historians who have overtly politicised history, I have always felt that analysing the past *can* and should provide raw material for many uses. These can range from government policy making to providing information useful for those engaged in pursuing social justice and harmony.

Long ago now there was a turn within the historical profession from political/state history towards rescuing the forgotten voices, especially the marginalised, exploited and oppressed. To cite Scott again, as he is the most recent person to have written on this, the purpose of such work was to give ‘those put down their just place on the stage.’<sup>3</sup> As time went on the New Zealand historiographical focus shifted from the underdog status of such people, Maori and pakeha, to stressing their agency – their efforts, in the face of great odds, to secure individual self sufficiency or collective self determination.

### ***DEFINITIONS OF RANGATIRATANGA***

In the case of Maori, exercise of agency has been explored in recent times by a number of historians. Maori efforts were seen as extraordinarily robust and resilient. Some historians, of whom I am one, have highlighted Maori agency in the context of the rangatiratanga promised Maori in the Second Article of the Treaty of Waitangi. The concept is hard to translate, but it seems best to equate rangatiratanga with autonomy, as the Waitangi Tribunal has done. What I *do not* do is to attempt to define it precisely. My whole argument involves rangatiratanga both changing through time, and having a variety of different organisational manifestations: tribal, subtribal, pantribal or nontribal. Of course, Maori differ on definitions according to their circumstances or views. Increasingly, however, there is an appreciation within Maoridom that there can be different forms of rangatiratanga with different aims and aspirations. What *is* uniform and resilient is the *quest* among Maori for Crown recognition of rangatiratanga, however that might be manifested. I will here provide just one recent example, from Hana O’Regan of Kāi Tahu, of Maori respect for differing definitions:

This book is concerned with ethnic identity and focuses on the experiences of Kāi Tahu and the factors influencing Kāi Tahu identity. These factors are discussed within the context of the wider Māori identity and the New Zealand environment.

Through my research I grasped an understanding of how cultural and ethnic identities develop and are represented in a pluralistic society. I realised how that process supported and validated cultural differences and deviations from perceived norms. This book has developed out of that understanding.

I did a bit of growing up in the process. I had previously been somewhat entrenched in the righteousness of my own cause in the tribal versus pan-Māori debate to the extent that I would argue at length against the validity of the latter in order to support the former. Part of that growing up was the realisation that if I expected others to respect Kāi Tahu for our differences and the choices we have made through time, then I needed to respect the choices made by others, including pan-Māori groups and urban Māori.

The tribe is an entity which is seen at the present time to be the best and most effective mechanism for Kāi Tahu to achieve the dreams and visions of the people. This may change as societal and political pressures change and impact upon the collective. However, for the moment it is the tribal identity that the descendents of the Blue Book have opted for to lead them through the new century. If the tribal structures fail to change and adapt to the environment, neglecting the needs of the collective, then they will be replaced with other structures.<sup>4</sup>

Having taken a non-prescriptive view of rangatiratanga, I stress again that I am an historian of the state and its interactions with its citizens. Ever since days long ago as a political activist, and then as an historian of nineteenth and early twentieth century policing in New Zealand, I have been fascinated by the ways the state controls people – controls them as both individuals and collectivities. It does so by using a continuum of control methods which range from overt coercion (up to and including killing people) to hegemonic (including ‘winning their hearts and minds’), and I have described mechanisms of control in New Zealand at great length elsewhere.

### ***STATE ATTITUDES TO RANGATIRATANGA***

The state has always seen rangatiratanga as a threat to its own interests (or more broadly, to those of the citizenry as a whole). It is seen to need control particularly because it is a collectively organised phenomenon. In policing, for example, it continued to see a collective Maori threat long after it perceived pakeha could be policed as individuals rather than as collectivities (of say, turbulent goldminers). Because of Maori communalism, the Crown has seldom been comfortable about fitting rangatiratanga within the desired frameworks of state and society; it has tried to suppress or defuse or deflect it.

As one of a number of scholars internationally who were ‘putting the state back’ into studies of social history, I found this provided an interesting example of state mechanisms of social control. To pursue it, I had to try to get to grips with the phenomenon of rangatiratanga, and the way it operated and its aspirations through time. We know a lot about Crown-Maori relations in the nineteenth century. We know that Maori already knew full well the might of the state by 1900 – a state that had often exercise coercion against them. Given the immense power of the state, then and now, to ignore or downplay it when considering the history of Maori agency is actually to downplay the achievements of Maori in their assertion of agency – to denigrate Maori gains for rangatiratanga in the face of state determination to assimilate it out of existence.

### ***STATE AND RANGATIRATANGA 1900-1950***

In general terms, then, this project was initiated through a need to take into account, in my work on social control, the rangatiratanga which was at last being discussed by some scholars. In particular, to get back to the book, there was a need to look at the first half of the twentieth century. I had first become fully aware of a hiatus in knowledge of Crown-Maori relations in this period when I became a Crown policymaker in 1989. I had the job of briefing ministers on previous settlements with Maori, of which there were a number – from the South Island Landless Natives Act of 1906 through to a flurry of settlements from 1944 onwards. Literature on these other negotiations proved to be practically nonexistent. In fact, there wasn’t a great deal of material at all on Maori per se for this period, let alone on Crown-Maori relations. This may well reflect the fact that during this time most Maori lived in isolated pa, well away from the pakeha gaze: a country can be touted throughout the western world as possessing ‘the best race relations in the world’ when the dominant culture has very little interaction with the indigenous one. Maori were an exoticising touch in the tourist brochures, not part of life for most New Zealanders.

When the Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit (TOWRU) was established in the late 1990s, the research gap still had not been filled. TOWRU was geared to producing reports to assist the Treaty resolution processes, but I remained interested in rescuing Crown–Maori relations from their post 1900 neglect. I return to my opening remarks here: not only was the topic intrinsically interesting, but also it seemed to have very serious implications. If Maori have an overarching and enduring desire to effect

rangatiratanga, and pakeha and the Crown either do not know this or do not appreciate its full import, then the future of our race relations must surely remain problematic: two peoples ‘talking past each other’, as it has been put.

### ***HYPOTHESES***

As matters turned out, a Crown Forestry Rental Trust-commissioned report for the treaty resolution processes, relating to the 20th century, gave me the chance to do some research on which to develop hypotheses on both land-based and people-based rangatiratanga, and on the Crown’s reaction to them. Then the Marsden Fund came through with funding, which enabled me to assemble four scholars, Maori and Pakeha, to examine some of the hypotheses in greater depth. These hypotheses related both to the relentlessness of the Crown’s pursuit of assimilation, and to the enormous resilience of Maori in the face of it. They were featured prominently in advanced drafts of my book.

So far the results have generally borne out the hypotheses, and the book proceeded as planned. In essence then, the rangatiratanga paradigm has held up; so has that of a flexible but controlling Crown, aiming as it does to suppress, contain, deflect or incorporate rangatiratanga in the interests of what it perceives to be ‘the public good’. The hypotheses have been, if anything, enhanced by the initial case studies: the intricacies of Crown-Maori relationships within the paradigms proved to be even more complex than expected. I will present an entrée into the findings, clustered first of all around events at the turn of the century.

### ***EMERGENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF 1900***

In 1900, there had been enormous pressure on the Crown to meet Maori aspirations. This had resulted from the convergence of several streams of Maori agency, especially two pantribal unity movements, Kingitanga and Kotahitanga. Although the year 1900 turned out to mark a demographic turning point towards recovery, there remained a strong pakeha belief that Maori would die out. But the Crown still had to confront the daily reality of pressure from many Maori sources to be able to manage those affairs that pertaining to themselves.


The state’s solutions were mediated by what became known as the Young Maori Party, a handful of western educated Maori who urged taking up the learning and tools of the pakeha. For shorthand I have called this stream of thought Ngataism, after their most

prominent leader, Sir Apirana Ngata. These men have generally been portrayed as straight assimilationists, but work by Graham Butterworth, Ranginui Walker and others has made it clear that most of them wanted to walk in both worlds. They wanted to take on that which was good in the pakeha world (eg better health) and discard only that which they considered 'bad' or outmoded in Maoridom (such as tohungaism).

Ngataism took many forms, but always insisted on preserving an ethno-communal base (usually a tribal one) from which to engage with the pakeha culture. This was the case with the mechanisms established in 1900 by Parliament. The purpose was in effect to deflect Kotahitanga's and Kingitanga's insistence that their own institutions be recognised, with two sets of institutions 'sold' to Maori as bicultural compromises between their aspirations and Crown imperatives.

### ***MAORI LAND COUNCILS***

The Maori Land Councils were touted to Maori as meeting their wishes for significant control over their remaining lands. But their main purpose was to speed up the process of getting settlers onto those lands: they were aimed, in short, at making Maori 'parties to their own submission' (a phrase from the nineteenth century which I cite in the first volume of my policing history).<sup>5</sup> The method was an old one in New Zealand, and indeed throughout empire: district runanga, marae-based komiti and other forms of indigenous institutions would be adapted, appropriated and officialised.




Maori would be allowed to have a large say in their running, and to do so in a way that had communal resonances. But they would be guided by pakeha authorities, and in the final analysis, were subject to the will of the state. Their activities, then, were severely constrained.

### ***MAORI COUNCILS***

The other appropriation of Maori organisational forms in 1900 was embodied in the Maori Councils. These were given some local government functions, with a network of marae-based committees to effect their rules and regulations – especially those relating to improving health and hygiene. These were matters that urgently needed

state attention in some way or other, and so it was convenient for the Crown to get Maori to do the tasks themselves. This is a recurring theme: the Crown appropriates Maori organisational forms and methods, and in doing so tries to both subsume autonomy and pursue its own interests.



Maori however, soon realised that the Crown was not about to allow the Maori Councils and the Maori Land Councils to become organs of self-determination or autonomy. Even the powers and resources initially given them, in fact, began to be whittled away early on, and a promised annual conference seldom convened. Yet in both cases, while some Maori quickly bypassed or abandoned them, other collectivities of Maori used them for their pursuit of rangatiratanga.

### ***PATTERNS OF INTERACTION***

And here we have the first manifestation in the twentieth century of a remarkable and recurring pattern which had operated in the 19th century too. The Crown faces pressure for rangatiratanga; it tries to suppress it, and on those occasions when it does not go away, it aims to defuse it by appropriating aspects of it - preferably in a way which will assist its own assimilationist, 'civilising' or developmental purposes. In the case of the 1900 institutions, the Crown is especially interested in leasing out land to settlers, and in improving services to villages so that Maori do not become a burden on the state. Often, improvements in living conditions for Maori did occur, but within the assimilationist paradigm of tolerating rangatiratanga as a temporary factor.

In turn, and this is where the case studies have so far assisted most in their accumulation of detail, Maori attempted to reappropriate the appropriation, in pursuit of self determinationist outcomes. This joins the evidence we have from the nineteenth century of Maori seeking to make the best use of whatever the Crown sends their way. This includes utilising institutions designed to subvert rangatiratanga, in order try to progress or effect rangatiratanga; in effect, 'subverting the subversion'.

Along the way, both parties in these processes often make both gains and retreats, in a series of clashes, negotiations or other interactions. Note that the title of my book is not State Authority *versus* Indigenous Autonomy, and that is deliberate. While the analysis does not downplay the enormous advantage the state has in its possession of material and coercive power, it does stress the intricacies of power relations and the resilience and adaptiveness of *both* sides.

Thus the Crown abolished the Maori Land Councils because Maori were using them for their own purposes rather than for freeing up vast tracts of land for pakeha. Instead, it instituted Maori Land Boards with token and eventually no Maori input. On the other hand, while many of the Maori Councils soon faded away, some kept going, and both sides saw benefits in that. After the First War the Crown realised that the Maori Councils could be adapted to assist it to run Maori health care, the area in which most of them had been most successful. In turn some of the new Maori Health Councils became centres for tribal assertion, headquarters for de facto mini states, a few of them lasting till the end of the Second World War.

### ***NGATAISM AND RATANAISM***


Meanwhile, far more powerful and innovative manifestations of rangatiratanga had been taking place. The first I have already broadly defined as Ngataism, or the working through of the Young Maori Party policies. Ngata himself gained great prestige and power, ultimately as Minister of Native Affairs. In this capacity he was able to put through land development schemes which maximised both national productivity and community or tribal control.

Around the same time in the 1920s came the remarkable rise of Ratanaism, which was not so much pantribal as nontribal, uniting the morehu or dispossessed. In its political form it demanded the rights promised in the Treaty – first those of autonomy in Article 2 (honouring ‘Maori self government’ was one of its two planks), and secondly those of the equality promised in Article 3. The campaign for equality coincided with the policies of the fledgling Labour Party – social and economic uplift for the masses. And so Ratanaism came increasingly into alliance with Labour – formally so after Labour’s accession to power in 1935. Labour’s establishment of the welfare state enormously benefited Maori in matters of the push for equality, such as health and housing, but the other plank of Ratanaism (and other movements), that of

autonomy, was never really understood or appreciated by Labour. This is a theme that I will be pursuing in my next book, right through to recent times.

### ***MAORI WAR EFFORT ORGANISATION***

However, even Labour had to come to grips with a strong assertion of rangatiratanga after the outbreak of World War Two. Again both parties (Crown and Maori) sought and found benefits. In this case, the country as a whole undoubtedly benefited greatly, so there is a positive lesson to be learnt from this case study.



When WWII broke out, Maori as much as pakeha flocked to support the war effort at home and abroad. Maori formed spontaneous committees on marae and elsewhere, and began to operate their own contribution to the war effort autonomously – usually in tribally based forms. The Crown soon came to the conclusion that such spontaneity was a threat to its established ways of doing things through the Native Department.

But it also saw that such enthusiasm could be harnessed to enhance the war effort.

The Maori War Effort Organisation was established, headed by the Maori MPs, to coordinate the committees and bring them under the control of the state. Many did carry out the Crown's wishes. But also the old pattern reoccurred: others of the officialised committees and their executives began to ignore central wishes, and conduct their own affairs in their own way, often going well beyond their formal briefs. Their communities benefited from the energies unleashed in running their own affairs, and so Maori as well as the state, and broader society and its war effort, gained.

Moreover, another theme inside Maoridom arose; Ngataism had been so powerful partly because it combined strengthening the communal tribal base with a loose tribal unity. This same combination arose in the Wartime effort: Maoridom felt empowered, and wanted the Maori War Effort Organisation to replace the Native Department after the war.

### ***MAORI WELFARE ORGANISATION***

The Crown concluded that while it had created a Maori organisation that was useful to it, it was exercising too much autonomy to be contemplated for peacetime purposes. Maori wishes implied two peoples in one nation, rather than the assimilation that would come when Maori gained full socio-economic equality with pakeha. Maori wishes, expressed strongly though the Maori MPs, were ignored in favour of a so-called compromise, the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act of 1945. This allowed the complex of committees and executives to continue, but in watered down form, with fewer functions, and worst of all, as constituent parts of the Native Department. The Crown tried to use the committees (grouped under the Maori Welfare Organisation) to both advance its assimilationist policies, and to contain Maori aspirations, sometimes not even permitting them fulfil their formal powers (eg to proclaim customary fishing areas).

So, the same pattern had occurred in terms of containing rangatiratanga. But equally, the same pattern reasserted itself in terms of Maori agency: committees continued to do their own thing, often exceeding their formal powers. Maori leaders in areas which had not opted into the new system saw it working elsewhere, not just in terms of socio-economic and other advances but also of autonomy as well. They opted in too, and by 1950, the entire country was formally covered by such a network.

### ***URBANISATION/ASSIMILATION***

The Maori Welfare Organisation had an unexpected consequence. It proved to be very useful for Maoridom in facing a new situation: that of urbanisation. The rangatiratanga initiatives of the first half of the twentieth century had essentially been posited on a predominantly rural Maoridom, as had the Crown responses. But the war exacerbated an incipient move into the towns and cities, and this continued after it. By 1950, Maori were poised to undergo what has been depicted as the most massive per capita internal migration of a people in peacetime history: what had been a 90 percent rural people in the early 1930s became 90 percent urban within a few decades. The escalation of urbanisation from 1950 coincided with the arrival to government of a National Party which was even more assimilationist than Labour; which came into office with the aim of abolishing all separate treatment.

Yet it too had to face the Maori reality. The new government faced a people who continued to identify as Maori, despite urban migration – a people who wanted to take their communal modes of organisation with them into the large towns and cities. The Maori Welfare Organisation's committee system was one way of doing so, supplementing informal associations such as sports and religious groups. The tribal-based komiti system, then, established as a stopgap pending assimilation, was adapted to the cities – often in the form of pantribal committees and executives, with new leaders who weren't necessarily traditional rangatira. In short, the reconstituting of Maori communities in the cities took advantage of the official komiti to assist their adjustment. This occurred in many ways, including by operating their own police ('Maori Warden') and justice systems.

The expansion of official komiti into the urban spaces was encouraged by the government, needing as it did to find ways of mitigating the worst effects of the mass movement of a people from the community-based social control structures of the countryside to the individualised lifestyles of the cities – crime and disorder is of course one of the classical products of this sort of migration, particularly as a result of excessive drinking associated with the anomie of the city life. So the system established under the 1945 Act had its use for all parties – and for Maori, those uses included providing resourced and legalised ways of running their own affairs in dramatic new circumstances.

### ***MAORI WOMEN'S WELFARE LEAGUE***

The Maori Welfare Organisation's official komiti were supplemented early on by other initiatives. Maori women, for example, newly horized by wartime experiences, often continued the wartime women's committees after the War. Eventually these became so useful to the state as well as to Maori that the Crown took them under its wing. It then encouraged them to come together as the Maori Women's Welfare League in 1951, so that their activities could be better coordinated – and, some might say, controlled

For the Maori Women's Welfare League, while an independent organisation, was one which received Crown funding and operated in some ways as a Crown entity. Yet in other ways its branches operated as an expression of rangatiratanga. Indeed in one crucial sense it was the national agency that negotiated with the Crown, or at least passed on the views of Maoridom, in the 1950s. In 1945 the Crown had refused to

allow regional or national groupings for the komiti system, having seen the power the centralised Maori War Effort Organisation had accrued. In the 1950s, when Maoridom did not disappear as expected or hoped for, the state found that it suited it to deal with a national Maori body to consult with. The Maori Women's Welfare League turned out to be that body.

### ***HUNN REPORT***

By 1960, although assimilation still had not happened even in the urban spaces, it was believed to be imminent. Government policy was increasingly to give it a push. The famous 'Hunn Report' of 1960 combined such assumptions with the voice of 'progressive' pakeha who called for special assistance for Maori. This had the benefits of seeking to remove the blatant racism which had reemerged with the urban migration, but the call for special attention was designed to effect socio-economic progress – to achieve what was called 'integration'. While this was technically defined as combining the races rather than seeing Maoridom disappear, Maori saw it essentially as the same old policies of assimilation under a new formulation.

### ***THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI COUNCIL***

The new National government forged ahead with assimilationist policies, in tandem with implementing the Hunn Report. But it still needed to interact with a Maoridom which stubbornly not only refused to disappear, but was continuing to enhance its organisational strength in the cities and their suburbs. In particular, it needed a national body more representative than the MWWL to talk with, having already conceded that the komiti system could have regional bodies.

In 1961-2 the Crown altered the 1945 system in several ways, including further utilising Maori collective organisation to create voluntary welfare committees. It also placed at the apex of the committee system a national body, the New Zealand Maori Council, designating it to be the official voice of Maoridom (which it still is).

But here again the old pattern reoccurred: the welfare committees often worked to their own agendas, and while the Maori Council was generally a conservative body, it came soon to resist the assimilation. It led the fight against the Maori Affairs Amendment Act of 1967, for example, which sought to free up Maori land for development by stripping owners of certain rights. While there had been much talk that urbanisation equated to detribalisation, this had generally not occurred: the

importance of the land, of turangawaewae or a place to stand, remained precious to most who had gone to the cities – and who returned to their marae for tangi and other occasions. Soon the New Zealand Maori Council was fighting, albeit in different ways, alongside the new generation of Maori radicals who spearheaded the Maori Renaissance from the early 1970s.

### ***MAORI RENAISSANCE***

This generation, a product of city-based education, created its own organisations. These formed and reformed over the years, often focussing on hikoi or Waitangi Day or other protests. This in turn could lead to state suppression of such new manifestations of collective endeavour, such as the massive clearance of Bastion Point – a reversion to previous ways of crushing aspirations for rangatiratanga. But the state generally preferred the soft approach, as indeed did many Maori in their struggles with the state.

In some interpretations one can even see the Waitangi Tribunal, founded in 1975 as a result of the pressures of the new Maori Renaissance, as a vehicle for expression of rangatiratanga. When in 1985 its hearings powers became retrospective to 1840, its reports were enormously useful for Maori aspirations. Addressing historical grievances were often necessary before a tribe could move on to a self-determinationist future – both ‘psychologically’ (‘transitional justice’) and in terms of resources. By the mid 1990s not only were settlements being effected, but also the Tribunal itself was operating within a paradigm of interpreting Maori colonial and postcolonial history in terms of the search for autonomy or rangatiratanga.

### ***POST ASSIMILATION***

Meanwhile, some Maori who had not joined the radical protest groups were nevertheless becoming finally disillusioned with Labour. They began to turn to new parties, beginning with Matiu Rata leaving Labour in 1979 and then founding Mana Motuhake (a strand of assertion that goes right through to the formation of the Maori Party in 2004). By that time the Crown was beginning to see that assimilation was never going to work – that rangatiratanga had to be addressed in more meaningful ways than in the past. It began to encourage Maori-based initiatives, even to talk about devolving a certain amount of its own power to Maori organisations. At the second Hui Taumata on 1 March 2005, the Minister of Maori Affairs spoke with

reference to the first one in 1984: ‘The message ... was clear. Maori had to be empowered to initiate, design and deliver their own solutions.’<sup>6</sup> By 1987 even the Department of Maori Affairs had been talking of ‘giving effect to the Government and Maoridom’s aspirations to achieve rangatiratanga’.<sup>7</sup>

### ***DEVOLUTION***

The 1989 *Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi* talked of kawanatanga being tempered by the rangatiratanga of Article 2 being given an ‘appropriate priority’. In a sense this was the peak period for Crown recognition of rangatiratanga. But many Maori noted that the *Principles*’ definition of rangatiratanga as iwi self-management meant very little in practice. Prime Minister David Lange is infamously reported to have answered, when asked around this time if the Crown were seriously considering granting governance to Maori, that it would no more do so than it would for a Rotary Club. In other words, the *Principles for Crown Action* authorised Maori entities to do no more than those activities that any private organisations could do. The government’s foremost motivations at this time for devolution were essentially reflective of policies of taking the state out of the nation’s affairs as much as possible, not of empowering iwi in a political direction and/or promoting rangatiratanga.

But as in the past, many Maori saw that Crown offerings could be utilised in their struggle for rangatiratanga, and many participated in the shortlived experiment of devolution to iwi authorities. When the new National government was quickly forced to drop its mainstreaming policies as a result of the realities it faced, it undertook watered down devolutions – such as encouraging Maori organisations, traditional and non-traditional, to take up contracts for state services. Maori often participated in these as second best options.

But such ventures *did* provide vehicles for progressing rangatiratanga and, moreover, there was now considerable public discourse about such issues as autonomy. No pakeha who kept an eye on things could be under any illusion that rangatiratanga remained firmly on the agenda within Maoridom – it was highlighted for example by a new pantribal movement, the National Maori Congress, which operated effectively as a lobby in the first half of the 1990s – and in mid decade by three hui, called together by Sir Hepi Te Heuheu at Hirangi, which called for constitutional change in an autonomous direction.

## CONCLUSION

I will be stopping the next book in 2000, the year in which I wrote:

It would seem that *rangatiratanga* in any sphere of Maori life will need to depend on Maori organisations negotiating arrangements with the state that avoid the Crown's desire to appropriate that has so dominated past 'concessions' to *rangatiratanga*. Whatever the case, if the history of Crown-Maori relations in New Zealand and the whole experience of imperialism [and post-colonialism] is a reliable guide – and it would be remarkable were it not – the Maori quest for autonomy will continue and will not go away until an end that is satisfactory to the *tangata whenua* is achieved. At least unlike in 1900, a hundred years later the debate to find a *modus vivendi* between Crown sovereignty and Maori autonomy is intense, public and nationwide.<sup>8</sup>

The fact that by the end of the twentieth century there *was* such a debate, and that it continues strongly, gives me hope that, whatever the short-term glitches, a longterm<sup>9</sup> solution to the problem of structuring *rangatiratanga* within New Zealand politics, society and culture can be negotiated in a way that satisfies all parties.

## REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> Dick Scott, *A Radical Writer's Life*, Auckland, Reed, 2004, p 318.

<sup>2</sup> Scott, p 333.

<sup>3</sup> Scott, p 333.

<sup>4</sup> Hana O'Regan, *Ko Tahu, Ko Au: Kāi Tahu Tribal Identity*, Christchurch, Horomaka Publishing, 2001, p 172.

<sup>5</sup> Richard S Hill, *Policing the Colonial Frontier: The Theory and Practice of Coercive Social and Racial Control in New Zealand, 1767-1867*, Wellington, Historical Publications Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs, Government Printer, 1986, p 801.

<sup>6</sup> Hon Parekura Horonia, 'Speech notes prepared for Hui Taumata 2005', 1 March 2005, <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=22330>.

<sup>7</sup> Richard S Hill and Vincent O'Malley, *The Maori Quest for Rangatiratanga/Autonomy, 1840-2000*, Wellington, Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit, Occasional paper 4, 2000, p 23.

<sup>8</sup> Hill and O'Malley, p 24.