

EROTICS AND FRIENDSHIP IN EMPEROR JULIAN'S FOURTH ORATION¹

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Abstract. This paper explores the emperor Julian's use of pederastic and same-sex sexual tropes to characterize the importance of his friendship with Saturninius Secundus Salutius. The "Self-Consolation" or *Oration 4* is read in light of its intertextualities with Theocritus, Plato, and various ancient discussions of dreams with nocturnal emissions.

ἢ τούτους μὲν ἄτε δὴ μείζονας καὶ περὶ μειζόνων οὐ κινητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν
θεάτρῳ μικρῷ μηχανὰς μεγάλας . . .

(Julian. *Or.* 4.3.244A)²

¹ This article is based on presentations given at the 2004 Classical Association of the Atlantic States meeting in Philadelphia, the 2005 meeting of the American Philological Association in Boston, and the 2008 meeting of the Australasian Society for Classical Studies in Christchurch, New Zealand. I thank the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand) for its support. My friends Kirk Ormand, Arthur Pomeroy, and Steven Smith graciously shared their expertise with me and Jen Oliver was unfailingly reliable in securing tomes that she teasingly pretended seemed odd. I am grateful to William Dominik for all his considerable help. As always, this is for TRH and I give a pat to N.

² Unless otherwise credited, all translations are my own and references are to Julian's fourth oration in the absence of further specification. When I have adapted a translation, no disrespect is intended. I make changes with an eye toward supporting my argument. For texts of Julian's works, I use those from l'Association Guillaume Budé: J. Bidez (ed. and tr.), *L'Empereur Julien: Oeuvres Complètes, Discours de Julien César (I-V)* (Paris 1932); G. Rochefort (ed. and tr.), *L'Empereur Julien: Oeuvres Complètes, Discours de Julien Empereur (VI-IX)* (Paris 1963); C. Lacombrade (ed. and tr.), *L'Empereur Julien: Oeuvres Complètes, Discours de Julien Empereur (X-XII)* (Paris 1965); and J. Bidez (ed. and tr.), *L'Empereur Julien: Oeuvres Complètes, Lettres et Fragments* (Paris 1924). I also have occasion to consult and cite W. C. Wright (ed. and tr.), *The Works of the Emperor Julian* (Cambridge 1923). The other classical texts are as follows (in order of appearance, other than to avoid repetition): the text of Aristotle, *Ethica Eudemia* is that of F. Susemihl (ed.), *Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia* (Amsterdam 1967); of Plato, *Symposium* J. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera 2* (Oxford 1967); of Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* I. Bywater (ed.), *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Oxford 1962); of Menander Rhetor D. A. Russell and N. G. Wilson (edd. and tr.), *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford 1981); of Ammianus Marcellinus W. Seyfarth *et al.* (edd.), *Ammiani Marcellini Rerum Gestarum Libri Qui Supersunt*² 1-2 (Stuttgart 1978); of Themistius, *Oration 22* H. Schenkl and G. Downey (edd.), *Themistii Orationes Quae Supersunt* 1 (Leipzig 1965); of Jerome, *Vita Pauli* E. M. Morales (ed.), *Trois Vies de Moines* (Paris 2007); of Theocritus A. S. F. Gow (ed.), *Theocritus* 1² (Cambridge 1965); of Plato, *Charmides* J. Burnet (ed.), *Platonis Opera 3* (Oxford 1968); of Artemidorus, *Oneirokritika*

Or are these [words to be acted-out], inasmuch as they are greater and are about greater things, not to be set in motion, as though they were great stage machinery in a small theater . . . ?

The fourth oration of emperor Julian, the “Self-Consolation on the Departure of the Most-Excellent Salutius,” so far as I know, has not been subjected in recent times to sustained critique. Julian wrote this substantial oration³ in 358/359 CE while he, as *Caesar*, was campaigning on the northern frontier. While the details are murky, it appears that Salutius,⁴ who had been the holding the *quaestura sacri palatii* in Julian’s court,⁵ was summoned across the Alps so that Julian’s cousin, emperor Constantius II, could install Lucillianus (who would keep a closer eye on the goings on). In the “Letter to the Athenians” (10.282C), Julian portrays the summoning of Salutius as a hostile move calculated to isolate him. This oration often has been seen, quite logically, as a testament to Julian’s anguish over the departure of his friend and advisor, with whom he shared philosophical interests.⁶ I agree that the oration is revelatory of anguish,

R. A. Pack (ed.), *Artemidori Daldiani Onirocriticon Libri V* (Leipzig 1963); of Aristotle *De Insomniis* W. D. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle: Parva Naturalia* (Oxford 1970); of Caelius Aurelianus *On Chronic Diseases* I. E. Drabkin (ed.), *On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases* (Chicago 1950); of Oribasius, *Collectiones Medicae* J. Raeder (ed.), *Oribasii Collectionum Medicarum Reliquiae* 1-4 (Leipzig 1928); of *Constitutiones Apostolorum* M. Metzger (ed.), *Les Constitutions Apostoliques* 1-3 (Paris 1985-1987); of *Historia Monachorum* A.-J. Festugière (ed.), *Historia Monachorum in Aegypto* (Brussels 1971); and of Homer, *Iliad* T. W. Allen (ed.), *Homeri Ilias* 2-3 (Oxford 1931).

³ At about 3000 words, Julian’s *Oration 4* is roughly the length of Cicero’s *Pro Archia* and a few hundred words longer than Lysias’ *On the Death of Eratosthenes*.

⁴ Salutius’ full name is Saturninius Secundus Salutius and his name appears as Σαλούστιος in the oration and other Greek sources.

⁵ A. Gutsfeld, “Secundus,” *Brill’s New Pauly* (http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/uid=1773/entry?entry=bnp_e110628); J. Harries, “The Roman Imperial Quaestor from Constantine to Theodosius II,” *JRS* 78 (1988) 156-58 discusses the development of the office of *quaestor* in the fourth century and describes Salutius himself in his role as *quaestor*.

⁶ Controversy may attend this claim about shared philosophical interests. There is a minor late-Platonic treatise (*De Deis et Mundo*) that is clearly related to Julian’s eighth oration (both the treatise and oration feature similarly complexed discussions of Attis, as well as marked similarities of thought). “Saloustios” is the author of this treatise. Debate has centered on whether the author is the same as the addressee of the consolation (Saturninius Secundus Salutius) or a certain Flavius Sallustius (who was consul with Julian in 363)—for the Greek name will allow either identification. What makes this debate relevant to the present discussion of Julian’s fourth oration is that if Saturninius Secundus Salutius is the author, then the treatise is further evidence (over and beyond that on display in the oration) of intellectual interests shared by him and Julian. I incline to identification of the author of this treatise as Saturninius Secundus Salutius (and I have support in this from, e.g., E. Clarke, “Communication, Human and Divine: Saloustios Reconsidered,” *Phronesis* 43 (1998)

but I also see it as revelatory of a connection between the politically significant relationship of Salutius and Julian and same-sex sexual desire. In arguments to come, I will explore the same-sex sexual imagery that characterizes Julian’s words about his friendship with Salutius and the uses this imagery serves. We will discover in particular that Julian uses this imagery to mark out his friendship with Salutius as an important relation that deserves respect; the imagery ultimately serves a political purpose. First, however, I offer a survey of prior scholarship in the interests of contextualizing the investigation that will follow.

As said above, *Oration* 4 has been read as indicative of Julian’s distress at his enforced separation from his friend. Bowersock perceives in the oration “an elaborate and intense discourse of regret on [Salutius’] departure”⁷ and Athanassiadi-Fowden, attuned to the marked intertextuality of the speech with Homer, sees anguish over separation from his friend contrasted with a vision of the lost Eden of his boyhood studies;⁸ the trauma of the present separation parallels that caused by his having to leave his boyhood teacher, Mardonius (2.241C). Also sensitive to the intertextuality with Homer in the oration, Rosen underscores its topical conventionality.⁹ And he is correct: handbooks provide patterns which Julian uses.¹⁰ Scholarship about this speech has also considered what it tells the reader about Julian’s notion of friendship, for he and Salutius have a friendship (φιλία: 2.242C) and they are friends (φίλοι: 2.242A, 3.242D, 3.243C).¹¹ Bringmann notes that Julian presents in this oration “ein Denkmal seiner Freundschaft” with Salutius.¹² We can connect Bringmann’s comment to some scholarship from the 1990s. Smith draws attention to the oration’s substantial engagement with Aristotle’s exposition of friendship such as we find

347-50; G. Rochefort, *Saloustios: De Deis et Mundo* (Paris 1960) x-xxi; and A. D. Nock, *Sallustius: Concerning the Gods and the Universe* (Cambridge 1926) ci. On the other hand, L. Brisson (“Salustius,” *Brill’s New Pauly* [http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/uid=1773/entry?entry=bnp_e1028720]) regards the question still open. A. Jones, *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire 1: A.D. 260–395* (Cambridge 1971) 796 is of the opinion that the author is not Saturninius Secundus Salutius but is perhaps Flavius Sallustius.

⁷ G. W. Bowersock, *Julian the Apostate* (Cambridge 1978) 45.

⁸ P. Athanassiadi-Fowden, *Julian and Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography* (Oxford 1981) 20f.

⁹ K. Rosen, *Julian: Kaiser, Gott und Christenhasser* (Stuttgart 2006) 167.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Menander Rhetor 2.395.1-399.10 (on the *logos propemptikos*) and discussion by F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh 1972) 7-16, esp. 7-10.

¹¹ Julian also refers to Salutius as his *philos* in *Oration* 5 (10/282C) and *Oration* 11 (44/157B).

¹² K. Bringmann, *Kaiser Julian* (Darmstadt 2004) 65.

it in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*¹³ and Guido, writing at greater length in an important article on Julian's understanding of *philia* across all of his works,¹⁴ also notes Julian's frequent resort to Aristotle in the oration.¹⁵ I stress here that Julian's oration is highly learned and its readership, as recipients of the *paideia*, would have been learned too.¹⁶ Given that this is the case, reading the oration via Aristotle now reproduces a plausible late-ancient reception, and is the beginning of my argument.

Without denying the emotional component to the oration (as is mentioned by Athanassiadi and Bowersock), I am in part interested in continuing with approaches to the speech that see it as revelatory of the friendship that existed between Julian and Salutius. To this end, I further flesh out the commonalities between this friendship and Aristotle's ideas on what a friendship should be. What emerges is that Julian leavens considerable similarities to Aristotle's conceptions with notable differences. Julian speaks of *παρρησία* ("frankness") and employs the verb derived from this noun (both at 3.243C) and elsewhere emphasizes the pure and uncalculated nature of the dealings that he and Salutius had with one another (e.g., 2.241D, 6.248D). These characterizations of his

¹³ R. Smith, *Julian's Gods: Religion and Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate* (New York 1995) 40f.

¹⁴ R. Guido, "La Nozione di Φιλία in Giuliano Imperatore," *Rudiae* 10 (1998) 125-29.

¹⁵ Noting that Aristotle is named twenty-three times in Julian's works, J. Bouffartigue, *L'Empereur Julien et la Culture de son Temps* (Paris 1992) 65, 200-02 sees at least second-hand reference to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the *Hymn to Helios*, the *Letter to Themistius*, and the oration *To the Uneducated Cynics*. Bouffartigue sees no mention of the *Eudemian Ethics* in Julian's works. Building upon Guido's and Smith's remarks, my analysis sees evidence of both these works of Aristotle in *Oration 4*.

¹⁶ The importance of education, or the *paideia*, to elite men in the later Roman empire probably cannot be overstated. For the pervasiveness of the *paideia* in late antiquity, see, e.g., P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire* (Madison 1992) *passim*; R. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley 1988) *passim*; A. Cameron, "Education and Literary Culture," in A. Cameron and P. Garnsey (edd.), *Cambridge Ancient History 13: The Later Empire A.D. 337-425* (Cambridge 1998) 665-707; and A. Kaldellis, *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition* (Cambridge 2007) 120-72. N. Lenski, *Failure of Empire: Valens and the Roman State in the Fourth Century A.D.* (Berkeley 2002) 92-97, 371 notes that emperor Valens' lack of conspicuous educational attainment made relations with the highly educated elites of Asia Minor difficult and put him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the usurper Procopius (cf. R. Van Dam, *Kingdom of Snow: Roman Rule and Greek Culture in Cappadocia* [Philadelphia 2002] 80-94, 160-62). Mastery of the *paideia* also was essential to a career in the service of the emperor (see, e.g., F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World, 31 BC-AD 337* [Ithaca 1977] 83-101, 203-28; M. Vessey, "Sacred Letters of the Law: The Emperor's Hand in Late Roman [Literary] History," *Antiquité Tardive* 11 [2003] 345-58).

friendship with Salutius mark it as post-Aristotelian, for, as Konstan has shown, an emphasis on frankness is a feature of friendships in societies with extreme status discrepancies (e.g., the Hellenistic monarchies and the Roman republic and empire) and hence is a departure from the *polis*-based model about which Aristotle speaks.¹⁷ The appearance of frankness is not the sole difference from Aristotelian ideals of friendship: it is at this point that I take analysis of the oration in a direction that, so far as I am aware, has not been taken before.

In the course of his remarks, Julian makes reference to Plato's *Charmides* (especially 156D-157B) and Theocritus' *Idyll 12* (lines 10-16). This intertextuality, I argue, complects the friendship between these two grown men in pederastic terms and so marks a radical break between Julian's presentation of his and Salutius' friendship and Aristotle's conception of what a friendship should be.¹⁸ In the *Eudemian Ethics* (*Eth. Eud.*), for example, Aristotle notes that relations between lover and beloved are different from those between friends. There is a lack of common interests and the lover is often solely interested in things carnal:

¹⁷ D. Konstan, "Friendship, Frankness, and Flattery," in J. T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (Leiden 1996) 7-19; Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge 1996) 15-23, 93-105. See too fr. 12 from book 8 of Ennius' *Annales* (O. Skutsch, *The Annals of Q. Ennius* [Oxford 1985] 93f.).

¹⁸ A word about intertextuality may be welcome here. When I speak of intertextuality, I am thinking of the way in which meaning is made by readers/listeners at the time when they are reading or hearing a text. Perceptible links with prior literature—perceptible because of the high level of education among late-ancient elites—enable perceptions of meaning on the basis of a text's similarity to and difference from older texts (such as those by Theocritus and Plato). Readerly awareness of perceptible relations between texts allows for meanings to emerge. A frequent point of confusion as regards intertextuality is the fact that while the author writes his texts and indeed arguably sets out (and even has *the intention*) to quote Plato or Theocritus, any meaning that emerges is entirely dependent on the competence of the reader. In the absence of readerly competence the author's intention counts for nothing (even as we have to say that he is the one who has made reference to Plato, for example). It is also quite conceivable that readers make meanings on the basis of perceived relations with other texts that might surprise an author and even run counter to his intentions (could we know them, and we cannot). Recent stimulating treatments of intertextuality in late antiquity include G. Kelly, *Ammianus Marcellinus: The Allusive Historian* (Cambridge 2008) and M. Mastrangelo, *The Roman Self in Late Antiquity: Prudentius and the Poetics of the Soul* (Baltimore 2008). For treatments of intertextuality in the earlier empire, I have found the following most helpful: G. Conte, *The Rhetoric of Imitation: Genre and Poetic Memory in Virgil and Other Latin Poets* (Ithaca 1986); L. Edmunds, *Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry* (Baltimore 2001); D. Fowler, *Roman Constructions: Readings in Postmodern Latin* (Oxford 2000) 115-137; and S. Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry* (Cambridge 1998).

... ὁ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλίᾳ ὅμοιον εἶναι· τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν.

(Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 7.12.1245A 24-26)¹⁹

... love seems to be similar to friendship, for the lover of someone wants to be together [with his beloved]; not, however, in the way he especially should [if friendship is at issue], but instead in a sensual way.

Hence, in creating a web of intertextuality that includes the references to Plato and Theocritus, Julian not only transforms the substantial Aristotelianism of the friendship he depicts, he also raises the topic of sexual desire between adult males. As will be shown, it should not occasion surprise that Julian would trope his friendship in same-sex sexual terms; we can find similar instances in late antiquity. What is remarkable, as I will argue, is the degree to which Julian, even as he uses same-sex sexual desire as a metaphor for his friendship with Salutius, seems to suggest that it is more than mere metaphor. He seemingly lets the mask slip, if you will, twice. The reader can draw the conclusion that Julian is “really” feeling desire. For the reader of today, the seeming glimpse of something beyond the play of representation is intriguing and a temptation. But care is called for. In the first place, we have no knowledge about what really happened between Julian and Salutius. Furthermore, any seeming glimpse beyond the play of representation in this most rhetorical of documents must be understood as a further instance of rhetoric; Julian’s gestures toward reality are the devices of a rhetorical showman. And Julian ups the rhetorical stakes for, as I will argue, he audaciously figures his devotion to Salutius as something that could cause dreams accompanied by nocturnal emissions. This excessive figuration and the assertion of a devotion that ceases to use same-sex attraction as a metaphor and instead insists on its reality impress me as typical Julianic hyperbole. But it is hyperbole that sends a message to the readers and listeners of this oration about the power and durability of the connection between Julian and his friend: those who may wish to tamper with Salutius will have Julian to answer to for as long as Julian remains powerful. My analysis also attests to the intelligibility of male/male sexual desire in late antiquity and its perceptible connection to friendship. Here, then, is something rare because sexual desire between adult males is infrequently represented in accounts we have of same-sex desire in both the primary and secondary sources of late antiquity.

¹⁹ Cf. *Eth. Eud.* 7.3.1238B 35-40, 7.10.1243B 17-19; *Eth. Nic.* 8.4.1157A 6-10, 9.1.1164A 2-8.

Summary of the Fourth Oration

The oration begins with an address to Salutius in which Julian wonders how he will find the words to soothe the grief he feels. Perhaps music or a drug of some kind will be of help (1.240A-C)? As the oration continues, Julian philosophizes, considering whether or not adversity can be productive of pleasure (1.240C-241C). Reflections on the nature of his friendship with Salutius (2.241C-242D; to be discussed below) crescendo into a suicide threat (3.243D). At 3.244A (also to be discussed below), Julian makes reference to the Platonic account of the spells (ἐπωδαί) of Zamolxis which were to treat the handsome Charmides’ headache. Subsequent to the evocation of this famous scene of homoerotic desire, Julian changes tack and decides to speak ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἔργων . . . τὰ κλέα (“glories from the deeds of old,” 3.244B). In his discussion of Scipio Aemilianus and Laelius (4.244C-245C), he points up the equality of affection they had for one another through a reference to Theocritus’ pederastic *Idyll 12*. After mentioning other pairs of friends in history, Julian comes to Pericles and Anaxagoras. At this point, he gives a long speech to Pericles (5.246A-248B). In this *prosopopoieia*, Pericles reflects on and regrets the necessity of his separation from his friend. As far as Pericles is concerned, however, as long as they are able to think of one another, he and Anaxagoras will be able to ameliorate the pain of their separation.

Toward the end of this section of the oration Julian (anachronistically) embeds in Pericles’ speech a replay (5.247C-248B) of Plato’s “ladder of love” (*Smp.* 210A-211C), which climaxes in Pericles’ assertion that his and Anaxagoras’ devotion to things incorporeal (which takes its start from things corporeal) will ensure that they are not assailed by φαντάσματα (“visions”) in the night that have their basis in the body (which I understand, reading with attention to the broad context of late antiquity, to signify nocturnal emissions). When Pericles’ speech ends, Julian straightaway asserts that he cannot manage such sublimity and that he is concerned about the φαντάσματα that are assaulting him as he tries to fashion a consolation to ameliorate his grief (6.248C-D). Continuing the back and forth motion in the oration, a look to the future and hope for divine aid (6.249A-250A) give way again to skepticism about an ability to equal heroes of old but Julian will nonetheless try and hopes that God will aid him (6.250A-D). After a brief discussion of the excesses of Alexander the Great, Julian notes his more limited and sensible needs, saying that, ἄρκεϊ δὲ ἡμῖν καὶ φιλεῖν ὁμολογῶν μόνον, ἐς δὲ τὰ ἄλλα σιωπηλότερος ὢν καὶ τῶν Πυθαγόρα τελεσθέντων (“It is enough for me that [my friend] admit only that he loves me too and that he be more silent about other matters than the initiates of Pythagoras,” 7.251C-D). The oration ends with wishes for a safe voyage for his friend (8.251D-252D). In phrases that

recall the recommendations of Menander Rhetor (third century CE) for concluding a *logos propemptikos* (2.398.29-399.10) he hopes that Salutius' journey will be an easy one and that he will be received with joy wherever he goes. He looks forward to the day of reunion—which underscores that Julian sees their alliance as durable.

Friendship

As previously noted, the continuities between the picture Julian draws of his friendship with Salutius and the ideals of friendship elaborated by Aristotle have been touched on in prior scholarship.²⁰ I will now substantiate these continuities further in the interests of emphasizing how much of Aristotle is present in Julian's proffered model of friendship in this oration. This substantiation will place in sharp relief Julian's departure from the Aristotelian model when he has recourse to erotics—a departure that would have been recognized by his educated audience.

The reader of *Oration 4* soon discovers that Julian sees his friendship with Salutius as chiefly founded on moral excellence (ἀρετή) and secondarily on the way in which they have been of use to each other. The following passage features most of the commonalities Julian's conception has with Aristotle's ideals (and is therefore a good place to start):

Ἄλλὰ τούτου μὲν ἐξ ἴσης, ὡς ἔοικε, κοινωνοῦμεν, σὺ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀλγῶν μόνον, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀεὶ ποθῶν τὴν σὴν συνουσίαν καὶ τῆς φιλίας μεμνημένος, ἦν ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς μὲν μάλιστα καὶ προηγουμένως, ἔπειτα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρείαν, ἦν οὐκ ἐγὼ μὲν σοί, σὺ δὲ ἐμοὶ συνεχῶς παρέσχες, ἀνακραθέντες ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογήσαμεν, οὐχ ὄρκοις οὐδὲ τοιαύταις ἀνάγκαις ταῦτα πιστούμενοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Θησεὺς καὶ ὁ Πειρίθους, ἀλλ' ἐξ ᾧ ἀεὶ ταῦτα νοοῦντες καὶ προαιρούμενοι . . .

(Julian. *Or.* 4.2.242C-D)

We are partners equally in this [i.e., the pain this separation is causing]—you grieving only on my behalf and I both missing your company and remembering our friendship, emphatically and chiefly based on ἀρετή, and secondarily on its usefulness which I to you, and you to me, have continually provided—[this friendship] which we, having compacted it, swore to each other, not relying on oaths and such ties (as did Theseus and Perithoos) but through always thinking and choosing the same things . . .

The first thing to note is that the foundation of their friendship is ἀρετή (a sentiment that Julian echoes later in the words he gives to Pericles at 5.247D, 5.248A). The importance of ἀρετή reflects the ideals of friendship as elaborated by Aristotle, who declares on a number of occasions that the best friendship is

²⁰ Smith [13] 40f.; Guido [14] 125-29.

one based on ἀρετή (see, e.g., *Eth. Eud.* 7.2.1236B 1, 7.2.1237A 29-31, 7.2.1238A 30f.; *Eth. Nic.* 8.1.1155A 1-6), which he is at pains to distinguish from friendships that are based solely on utility or pleasure (see, e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 8.3.1156A 7-19 and *Eth. Eud.* 7.2.1236A 15-1236B 1). Seeming perhaps to run against this formulation of Aristotle, Julian here (and again at 3.243B) also characterizes his connection with Salutius as a χρεία, a thing of use or advantage, that benefits both of them. Furthermore, Julian elsewhere underscores the pleasure he receives from his friendship with Salutius saying that κοινωήσαντας γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλοις . . . πολλῶν δὲ ἡδέων ἔργων τε καὶ λόγων . . . κοινὸν εὕρισκεσθαι χρὴ τῶν παρόντων . . . παιωνικὸν ἄκος (“it is necessary for us, who have shared with each other many *pleasant* deeds and words to discover a shared remedy in the present circumstances,” 1.240B) and he complains that Salutius’ departure will render him μόνης . . . θαλπωρῆς τε καὶ τέρψεως ἐνδεής (“bereft of his sole comfort and *pleasure*,” 3.243C). These other details may seem to suggest that Julian is portraying his and Salutius’ friendship in terms of the two lesser friendships that Aristotle identifies, that is, those based on pleasure and use.²¹ But drawing this conclusion would be a mistake. Aristotle identifies pleasure and use as operative in friendships of the best kind declaring ἡδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ σπουδαῖος (“that the good/serious man [who is one to seek for a friend most of all] is said to be pleasant and useful, *Eth. Nic.* 8.6.1158A 34f.).²²

We can see further continuities between Julian’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of friendship in this passage. At the beginning of the passage quoted above (2.242C-D), Julian says that he and Salutius are partners in grief. The verb at issue, κοινώνω, and the related noun (κοινωνία) and adjective (κοινός) occur often in Julian’s oration (1.240A, 1.240B, 2.241C, 2.241D, 2.242A, 2.242C, 4.245A, 4.245B, 4.245D, 8.252C) and their occurrence marks another continuity with Aristotle.²³ Aristotle states quite directly that friendship is κοινωνία, a “partnership” or “community” (κοινωνία . . . ἡ φιλία, *Eth. Nic.* 9.12.1171B 32f.; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 8.12.1161B 11; *Eth. Eud.* 7.9.1241B 11-19, 7.10.1242A 19-22). The frequent occurrence of these words also connects the oration to Pythagoras’ notions of communality (a connection which Julian makes explicitly in the oration [see 4.245A, 7.251C-D]). A final continuity with Aristotle to note in the passage above is the presence of a tension between

²¹ For more on the three kinds of friendship Aristotle discusses, see L. Pangle, *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship* (Cambridge 2003) 37-56; A. W. Price, *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* (New York 1989) 131-61.

²² Cf. Pangle [21] 44, 50f.; Price [21] 137, 145, 151f.

²³ Both Guido [14] 125f. and Smith [13] 40f. note the importance of κοινωνία in Julian’s representation of his friendship with Salutius.

difference and sameness. Julian says that he and Salutius are equal partners in dismay over their separation. But what follows are words that assert difference: Salutius grieves on Julian's behalf while Julian pines for and ruminates on the companionship his friend provided. Explicitly directed toward his friend, Julian's affect is arguably more lavish than Salutius'. This disparity is a function of the difference in status between the two of them and provides a further instance of the influence of Aristotle. Aristotle remarks, ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις τὸ ἀνάλογον ἰσάζει καὶ σφάζει τὴν φιλίαν ("in all friendships based on dissimilarity, what is proportionate equalizes and preserves the friendship," *Eth. Nic.* 9.1.1163B 29f.).²⁴ The status differential between Salutius and Julian drives Julian in the direction of more overt display of affection as a sort of balance.²⁵ And this would not be the only time that Julian opted for a display of affection that ran counter to the protocols of deportment befitting a man of his status. Ammianus Marcellinus relates how Julian rushed out from the senate and greeted the philosopher Maximus enthusiastically and forgot what, Ammianus says, were the proper canons of imperial dignity.²⁶ The positions he held—first *Caesar* and then *Augustus*—and,

²⁴ Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 8.13.1162 2-4: τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα δεῖ τῷ φιλεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους τὸ ἀνάλογον ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς ἀποδιδόναι ("equals will need to keep things equal and strictly so, in terms of loving and everything else, while unequals will need to render what is proportionate to the superiority of one of the parties in each case").

²⁵ Menander Rhetor writes that a *logos propemptikos* addressed to an equal or to a social inferior who is a friend will avoid the giving of advice (which is suggestive of hierarchy) and instead will feature a display of affection: ἕτερος δὲ τρόπος ἂν γένοιτο, ἐν ᾧ δυνήσεται τις ἐνδείξασθαι ἦθος ἐρωτικὸν καὶ διάπυρον περὶ τὸν προπεμπόμενον, συμβουλὴν μὴ καταμινύς, τῆς ἀξίας ὑπαρχούσης ἐφαμίλλου καὶ τῆς δόξης ἴσης τῷ προπέμποντι καὶ τῷ προπεμπόμενῳ, ὡς ὅταν ἑταῖρος ἑταῖρον προπέμπῃ καὶ γὰρ εἰ βελτίων εἴη ὁ προπέμπων ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ἀπαίροντος, ἀλλ' οὖν ἡ κοινωμία τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι φίλους ἀφαιρεῖται τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς συμβουλῆς τὸν λέγοντα ("There would be another type [of *logos propemptikos*] in which the speaker will be able to express a passionate [ἐρωτικόν] and ardent attitude to the departing person without the addition of advice; this is when the reputation and position of the two parties are equal, e.g., when a comrade sees off a comrade [ἑταῖρος ἑταῖρον προπέμπῃ]. Even if the speaker in these circumstances is superior to the person who is going away, nevertheless the common title, the fact that both are friends [φίλους], deprives him of his advisory status," 2.395.12-20; trr. Russell and Wilson [2] 127 [adapted]). *Oration* 4 fits these comments on the *logos propemptikos* well. Julian finesses the difference in status between himself and Salutius through a desirous attitude, an emphasis on their friendship, and titles, e.g., ἑταῖρος, that stress equality.

²⁶ *Res Gestae* 22.7.3f.: *Frequentabat inter haec curiam agendo diversa, quae divisiones multiplices ingerebant. et cum die quodam ei causas ibi spectanti venisse nuntiatum esset ex Asia philosophus Maximus, exsiluit indecore et, qui esset, oblitus effuso cursu a vestibulo*

of course, his being a member of the house of Constantine—should have kept him from behaving as he did with Maximus as far as Ammianus is concerned, and, we may speculate, from displaying the apparently lavish informality that is in evidence in this oration.

Looking beyond the passage hitherto under discussion and out into the oration as a whole, a reader will discover a further connection with Aristotle’s notion of the friend, namely, that a friend is often a comrade or *ἑταῖρος*. Aristotle remarks at one point, *συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ’ ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄντας μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ὅπερ ἡ ἑταιρική δοκεῖ ἔχειν* (“it is not possible for people to live with one another if they are not pleasant and do not rejoice in the same things, as is the case with the friendship of comrades (*ἑταιρική* [sc. *φιλία*]),” *Eth. Nic.* 8.5.1157B 22-24; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 8.11.1161A 25-27, 8.12.1162A 9-11, 9.2.1165A 29f., 9.10.1171A 14f.; *Eth. Eud.* 7.10.1242A 1-5, 7.10.1242A 35-40). The reader will recall that Julian says that he and Salutius always think and choose the same things. Furthermore, Salutius is most assuredly Julian’s *ἑταῖρος*. Julian addresses him directly as *ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε* (“dear comrade,” 1.240A). Indeed *ἑταῖρος* appears in a paraphrase Julian makes from Plato (*Ep.* 7.325D), where it is noted that it is difficult to govern the state and, *ἄνευ φίλων ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἑταίρων πιστῶν οἷόν τε εἶναι πράττειν* (“without estimable friends and trusted comrades it is not possible to act,” 3.243A). In the speech he gives Pericles, Julian has him call Anaxagoras *τὸν ἄριστον . . . τῶν ἑταίρων* (“the best of comrades,” 5.246C). Finally, we read *ἑταῖρος* in the company of an injunction to Salutius that he continue to cherish Julian (and note also the presence of *κοινωνία* and *φίλος*): *στέργων δὲ ἡμᾶς ἥκιστα ποθήσαις ἀνδρὸς ἑταίρου καὶ φίλου πιστοῦ κοινωνίαν* (“keeping your regard for me constant, it is my desire that you never miss

longe progressus exosculatum susceptumque reverenter secum induxit per ostentationem intempestivam, nimius captator inanis gloriae visus praeclarique illius dicti immemor Tulliani, quo tales notando ita relatum: “ipsi illi philosophi etiam in his libris, quos de contemnenda gloria scribunt, nomen suum scribunt, ut in eo ipso, quo praedicationem nobilitatemque despiciunt, praedicari de se ac se nominari velint” (“[Julian] was frequently in the senate-house to settle the numerous disputed points which arose. One day, when he was hearing cases there, he was told that the philosopher Maximus had arrived from Asia. He forgot himself so far as to leap up in undignified haste, run out some way from the ante-room, kiss Maximus, and bring him into the chamber with every mark of respect. By this out of place and thoughtless performance he showed himself excessively anxious for empty distinction, forgetting the splendid saying of Cicero, who criticizes such ambition in the following words: ‘Those same philosophers inscribe their own names on the very books which they write urging men to despise glory; this shows their desire for reputation and recognition in the very act of preaching contempt for such distinctions,’” W. Hamilton [ed. and tr.], *Ammianus Marcellinus: The Later Roman Empire* [Harmondsworth 1986] 240 [adapted]).

having partnership [κοινωνίαν] with an estimable comrade [ἑταίρου] and trustworthy friend [φίλου],” 8.252C). Camaraderie also shows through in the various terms Julian applies to Salutius (the preposition σύν in each of these terms underscores the togetherness of comrades): Salutius is Julian’s συνασπιστής (“fellow-shieldsman,” 2.242A), his συνεργός (“fellow-worker,” 3.242D) and his συναγωνιστής (“partner-in-endeavor,” 7.251C).²⁷

Late-Ancient and Julianic Innovations

As said above, this friendship between Julian and Salutius exceeds the Aristotelian model in a key way when Julian uses erotic tropes in his presentation of it. Instead of being careful to distinguish the friendship from an erotic connection which it in some ways resembles, Julian’s proffered friendship creates questions on just this basis. Julian’s strategies lead the reader to wonder if there is any distinction between this friendship and an erotic relationship. Julian creates these questions in the first instance through reference to Plato’s *Charmides* and Theocritus’ *Idyll 12* and then makes these questions more insistent through indirect and then direct statements of his inability to live up to his forebears in the matter of self-control. As said above, a mask seems to slip and the sexual tropes seem to acquire constative force; Julian creates the suspicion that he is not speaking metaphorically but is in fact describing a reality, as will be shown below.²⁸ In any case, this figuring of friendship in pederastic/same-sex sexual terms is comparable to what we read in other texts in late antiquity.

Writing in his twenty-second oration in, perhaps, the 360s or 370s,²⁹ Themistius depicts the acquisition of friends in erotic terms. In this oration, entitled significantly for the present purposes “On Friendship,” Themistius speaks of men who are devoted to friendship not as competing with one another (as often happens when a woman is at issue; Them. *Or.* 22.266C) but as discovering what they want in each other:

²⁷ Speaking of Cato, Plato and Democritus at 4.245C-D, Julian notes that they undertook journeys on which they travelled alone, leaving behind συνήθεις (“intimates,” 4.245C). Hence, then, Salutius is by implication a συνήθης.

²⁸ I stress again and will reiterate below that the creation of suspicion of actual desire is a rhetorical strategy. While there may be a reality of actual desire underneath the representation, this possible reality is unavailable to us.

²⁹ There is no consensus about the date of *Oration 22* (see R. Penella, *The Private Orations of Themistius* [Berkeley 2000] 18).

μόνοι δὲ οἱ φιλίας ἐρῶντες οὐ μάχονται ἀλλήλοις περὶ τοῦ κτήματος,
ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐξευρίσκουσι τὰ παιδικά.

(Them. *Or.* 22.266D; cf. 272A-B)³⁰

Only those in love with friendship do not fight with one another over possession of it, but straightaway they discover their beloved boy in each other.

The metaphor for the discovered thing of desire is most assuredly sexual. The beloved boy, τὰ παιδικά, is roughly synonymous with the ἐρώμενος of Athenian pederasty. A similar dynamic is present in the somewhat later *Vita Pauli* of Jerome. In section 9, St. Antony is outside St. Paul’s hermitage, begging to come in and sounding for all the world like a locked-out lover:

Qui sim, unde, cur venerim, nosti. Scio me non mereri conspectum tuum, tamen nisi videro, non recedam. Qui bestias suscipis, hominem cur repellis? Quaesivi, et inveni, pulso ut aperiatur; quod si non impetro, hic, hic moriar ante postes tuos: certe sepelies vel cadaver.

(Jer. *Vita Pauli* 9)

You know quite well who I am, from where and why I have come. I know that I don’t deserve to see you. All the same I will not leave until I see you. You who welcome beasts, why do you repel a man? I have sought and I have found; I pound so that it may be opened. And if I do not get what I seek, here—here!—I shall die at your doorstep. You will certainly then bury a corpse at least.

Citing prior scholarship that sees Antony “playing Romeo to Paul’s Juliet,” Burrus persuasively suggests that these opening moves of the eventual communion of these two saints are an “almost parodically groping rite of courtship.”³¹ Indeed, as it is the case that Antony is complaining outside the locked door of his desired one, a reader will be thinking of the many *paraclausithyra* in the erotic poetry of previous centuries. The repetition of “here” (*hic, hic*) certainly recall Roman elegy.³²

Similar to what we read in Themistius and Jerome, Julian uses pederastic and same-sex sexual desire to talk about his friendship with Salutius. I will now discuss the two examples in the oration of intertextual evocation of pederastic

³⁰ For more on Themistius’ *Oration* 22, see Konstan [17 (Leiden 1996)] 16-19; Penella [29] 16-18.

³¹ V. Burrus, *The Sex Lives of Saints: An Erotics of Ancient Hagiography* (Philadelphia 2004) 30.

³² Furthermore, when Antony threatens suicide if he is not admitted, Jerome’s text recalls a scene of boyish cruelty to the importuning lover exemplified by Theocritus’ *Idyll* 23. In this poem, the lover, having been driven to utter despair by rejection, commits suicide by hanging himself outside the locked door of the boy’s house (49-52).

and same-sex desire. In the first example, it is arguable that Julian makes reference to Theocritus' *Idyll 12*. This poem is an amorous address by a mature male to a younger male on the occasion of the latter's return after a few days' absence. It is a work that Julian quotes on two other occasions in his works.³³ Here is the passage containing the reference:

‘Τί πρῶτον; τί δ’ ἔπειτα; τί δ’ ὑστάτιον καταλέξω’; πότερον ὡς ὁ Σκηπίων ἐκεῖνος, ὁ τὸν Λαίλιον ἀγαπήσας καὶ φιληθεὶς τὸ λεγόμενον ἴσῳ ζυγῶ παρ’ ἐκείνου πάλιν, ἠδέως μὲν αὐτῷ συνῆν, ἔπραττε δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν μὴ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος πύθοιτο καὶ φήσειεν εἶναι πρακτέον;

(Julian. *Or.* 4.4.244C-D)

“What is the first thing I will recount? What next and what last?”³⁴ How the famous Scipio—who loved Laelius and was loved by him in return, as the saying goes, “under an equal yoke”—[how Scipio] spent time pleasantly with him and how he did not do anything before [Laelius] was apprised of it and he said it needed to be done?

At this point in the oration, Julian is beginning his survey of famous pairs of men in history with Scipio Aemilianus (185/184-129 BCE) and his friend Laelius—a survey which will climax with Pericles and Anaxagoras. A relationship with structural similarity to that between Julian and Salutius, the friendship of these earlier Romans of different status nonetheless featured equal affection. The portion of this passage that has our particular interest is the phrase ἴσῳ ζυγῶ (“under an equal yoke”). As Wright points out in the Loeb edition, this recalls line 15 of Theocritus' *Idyll 12*. Here are the lines that contain the reference:

εἶθ’ ὁμαλοὶ πνεύσειαν ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέροισιν Ἔρωτες
νῶιν, ἐπεσσομένοις δὲ γενοίμεθα πᾶσιν ἀοιδή·
ἴδω δὴ τινα τῶδε μετὰ προτέροισι γενέσθην
φῶθ’, ὃ μὲν εἴσπνηλος, φαίη χ’ Ὀμυκλαϊάζων,
τὸν δ’ ἕτερον πάλιν, ὡς κεν ὁ Θεσσαλὸς εἴποι, αἴτην.
ἀλλήλους δ’ ἐφίλησαν ἴσῳ ζυγῶ. ἦ ῥα τότε ἦσαν
χρῦσειοι πάλιν ἄνδρες, ὅτ’ ἀντεφίλησ’ ὁ φιληθεὶς.

(Theoc. *Id.* 12.10-16)

Oh that equal loves should breathe upon us two and that all those who are to be have a song about us: “Divine were these two mortals in earlier days, the one the inspirer, as one speaking the speech of Amyclae would say, and the other the hearer, as a Thessalian would put it. *They loved* (ἐφίλησαν) each other *under an equal yoke* (ἴσῳ ζυγῶ). Indeed in truth were men golden *again*

³³ In *Epistle 96* (Bidez) / 52 (Wright) at 374C Julian refers directly to line two, and in *Misopogon* at 3.338D he has occasion to cite line 32.

³⁴ Julian quotes *Odyssey* 9.14 (though not completely correctly): Τί πρῶτόν τοι ἔπειτα, τί δ’ ὑστάτιον καταλέξω;

(πάλιν) at that time when the *beloved* (φιληθείς) *loved in return* (ἀντεφίλησαν).”

Comparing Julian’s text to that of Theocritus, the reader will note that not only is the phrase ἴσῳ ζυγῶ echoed, forms of the verb φιλέω appear three times and the adverb πάλιν once. Even though Julian says that the phrase is proverbial (“as the saying goes”), it would seem that he is putting down enough of Theocritus’ poem into the surrounding text that an educated reader (whom we may certainly assume for the oration) would connect it to Theocritus’ poem and sense Julian adding a pederastic complexion to the friendship of Scipio and Laelius, and hence to that between himself and Salutius.³⁵ A reader would not only be aided by his experience of Alexandrian poetry in forming this opinion, in the section prior to this one Julian makes explicit reference to a notorious passage from Plato which would prime a reader to make this particular connection. Arguably invoking Socrates’ asserted inability to maintain his composure when he was confronted by Charmides’ beauty, Julian then ostentatiously regrets the inclusion *in his own oration* of this reference to Plato as, he says, the reference has turned out to be something destructive to representation, something too real.

³⁵ Taking Julian at his word that the words ἴσῳ ζυγῶ are proverbial, J. Bouffartigue [15] 260f. believes that there is no reason to suppose that Julian had it in mind to be quoting Theocritus’ *Idyll 12* at this point. As has been shown, more of Theocritus’ text seems to be influencing the prose around the “proverbial” bit and this in turn strongly suggests that Julian was in fact quoting the poem (and that his readers were likely to recognize him doing so). I am not denying, of course, that the phrase ἴσῳ ζυγῶ had acquired by late antiquity proverbial status. As A. Gow, *Theocritus 2* [Cambridge 1952] 224 points out, we find the phrase, or near recollections of it, in sources Greek (Nicander, *Theriaca* 908; Theaetetes Scholasticus, *AP* 10.16.3) and Latin (Horace, *Carm.* 1.35.28; Propertius 3.25.8; Pliny the Younger, *Ep.* 3.9.8). To this list I add from the fourth century an instance of the phrase itself in Paulinus’ epistle to his friend Ausonius (*C.* 11.38-40 in W. A. Hartel and M. Kamptner (edd.), *Sancti Pontii Meropii Paulini Nolani* 30 [Vienna 1999]; *Ep.* 30.38-40 in H. G. E. White (ed.), *Ausonius 2* [London 1921]: *vix Tullius et Maro tecum / sustineant aequale iugum. si iugar amore, / hoc tantum tibi me iactare audebo iugalem* [“with difficulty would Cicero or Virgil hold up *an equal yoke* with you. If I will be yoked in love, on this basis alone will I dare to boast that I am your yoke-mate”]). I also draw the reader’s attention to the playful use of the word yoke (*iugum*)—and the related verb and adjective (*iugo* and *iugalis*)—seven times in lines 30-48 of this poem and to the wordplay involving *iugum* and the related adjective in Ausonius’ *Ep.* 24: see lines 1, 8, 15, 18, 40, 61, 82 (R. P. H. Green [ed.], *The Works of Ausonius* [Oxford 1991])—the letter to which Paulinus was responding. Note also that Ausonius has occasion to mention Laelius and Scipio (*Ep.* 24.37) in the context of discussion of his friendship with Paulinus.

When speaking earlier of the pain that the separation from Salutius is causing him, Julian wonders if the spells of Zamolxis, which helped the handsome Charmides (in Plato's dialogue of the same name) will help him:

Τί ποτε οὖν ἄρα χρή διανοηθέντα καὶ τίνας ἐπωδάς εὐρόντα πείσαι πρῶως ἔχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους θορυβουμένην τὴν ψυχὴν; ἄρα ἡμῖν οἱ Ζαμόλξιδος εἰσι μιμητέοι λόγοι, καὶ αἱ ἐκ Θράκης ἐπωδαί, ἃς Ἀθήναζε φέρων ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸ τοῦ τὴν ὀδύνην ἰᾶσθαι τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπάδειν ἡξίου τῷ καλῷ Χαρμίδῃ; ἢ τούτους μὲν ἄτε δὴ μείζονας καὶ περὶ μείζονων οὐ κινητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ μικρῷ μηχανὰς μεγάλας . . .

(Julian. *Or.* 4.3.244A)

What must I think now? What spells must I discover to persuade my soul, which has been disturbed by passion, to bear up with composure? Must I act out the words of Zamolxis and the spells from Thrace, which Socrates, bringing to Athens, deemed worthy to sing over handsome Charmides prior to curing his headache. Or are these words, inasmuch as they are greater and are about greater things, not to be set in motion, as though they were great stage machinery in a small theater. . . .

Coming on the heels of Julian's worry about how he is going to bear up without his friend (indeed, at 3.243D, Julian says that regret over this separation makes him think of suicide), Julian calls to mind Plato's *Charmides*. Would the spells of Zamolxis which Socrates affected to bring to Charmides help him deal with the pain of this separation?³⁶ In order to gauge the effects of this intertextuality, we must examine the *Charmides* more closely.³⁷

Shortly after the dialogue begins, Socrates, Chaerephon and Critias are talking about Critias' handsome cousin Charmides, who shortly arrives and becomes one of the interlocutors in the dialogue. When Charmides arrives, all the men and boys in the scene are transfixed by the intensity of Charmides' good looks. Chaerephon at this point addresses Socrates:

³⁶ Julian also mentions Zamolxis twice in his satire of his predecessors, *Caesares*. At 4.309C, Zeno is able to make Octavian wise and temperate providing spells (ἐπωδάς) of the kind that Zamolxis used to employ and, at 28.327D, Julian mentions that Zamolxis was an illustrious ancestor of the Goths.

³⁷ Jean Bouffartigue [15] 177 is skeptical that Julian would have seen and is relying on his audience having read the actual text of the *Charmides*. I see no reason to consider this case made, indeed I find it puzzling that Julian, who is one of the minor figures of late Platonism, has to be declared functionally ignorant of Plato. As Bouffartigue's own analysis shows, Julian makes reference to eighteen of Plato's works in a total of eighty-one references. But even granting that Julian acquired the passage in question through a handbook or from a life of Socrates, this text would have often fallen into the hands of those who would have known the *Charmides* firsthand.

Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;
Ἵπερφυῶς, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὐτός μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῶναι, δόξει σοι
ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι· οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν.

(Pl. *Chrm.* 154D)

“What does the young man look like to you, Socrates?” [Chaerephon] said.

“Handsome face, no?”

“Supernatural.” I said.

“Yet,” he continued, “if he should be willing to disrobe, you will utterly forget his face, so all-beautiful is he as regards his form.”

Confronted with such physical beauty, Socrates decides characteristically that it is time to sublimate. He asks: Τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους; (“So—why haven’t we stripped this very part of him [i.e., his mind] and formed a complete picture of it before his form?”, 154E). But Socrates’ suggested strategy of bypassing consideration of the body to the more reputable evaluation of a virtuous mind’s beauty is, as it turns out, not so easy to put into practice. In order to get close to the object of his interest, Socrates takes up the suggestion that he pretend to be in possession of a cure for a headache Charmides had on the previous day. Learning that a cure for his headache is at hand, Charmides gives Socrates such a look that it discountenances the voluble philosopher (ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἶον, “he gazed upon me [Socrates] with a somehow irresistible look,” 155C-D). Then, as he teeters off balance because of this full-on inquisitive look from the handsome Charmides, Socrates inadvertently catches provocative sight of what’s inside Charmides’ cloak:

. . . τότε δὴ, ὦ γεννάδα, εἰδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμενην καὶ οὐκέτ’ ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν . . . ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος, εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην.

(Pl. *Chrm.* 155D-E)

. . . and then, my noble friend, I saw what was inside his cloak and I was set ablaze. I was no longer in possession of myself . . . but all the same, since he had asked if I knew the remedy for his head, I somehow and with difficulty answered that I knew it.

Seemingly struggling with desire, Socrates explains that while he was on campaign he learned of spells from one of the doctors of the Thracian king, Zamolxis:

. . . ἀλλὰ Ζάμολξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεύς, θεὸς ὢν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰᾶσθαι οὐδὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς . . . θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἐπωδαῖς τισιν· τὰς δ’ ἐπωδάς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρουσίας ῥάδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ

καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν. διδάσκων οὖν με τό τε φάρμακον καὶ τὰς ἐπωδάς, ὅπως, ἔφη, τῷ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ μηδεὶς σε πείσει τὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παράσχη τῇ ἐπωδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι.

(Pl. *Chrm.* 156D-157B)

[The Thracian doctor] said, “But Zamolxis, our king, who is a god, says, that just as one must not treat the eyes while excluding the head nor the head without the body, so one must not treat the body without taking the soul into consideration . . . the soul . . . is treated with certain spells. These spells are beautiful words. Through the agency of these sorts of words, temperance (σωφροσύνη) is born in souls. And if temperance has been born within and is present, it is easy at that moment to provide health to the head and the rest of the body.” And so, while teaching me the remedy and the spells he said, “Let no one, who would not offer his soul to be treated with the spell first, persuade you to treat his head with this remedy.”

After this, as it turns out, successful conversational gambit, Socrates proceeds to explore the nature of σωφροσύνη with Charmides throughout the rest of the dialogue. As the discussion proves to be inconclusive, the awkwardness and aphasia that temporarily afflict Socrates prefigure the contours of the remainder of this work. The question for us here is how the reader should understand Julian’s evocation of this work of Plato that features philosophical fumbling in the face of beauty’s irresistible glances and an all-beautiful physique.

I suggest two ways to interpret this reference to the *Charmides* and in the end it seems that the reader is best off keeping both in mind. On the one hand, Julian invokes the spells of Zamolxis as a means to ease his own pain at his separation from his friend. This particular invocation has the effect of making Julian into the handsome Charmides, an object of desire. But since, on the other hand, Julian observes that he is the one who may have to act out these words, it appears that Julian is to be seen as Socrates also—the desiring one. The net result of this flexibility on the part of Julian (and, by implication, on the part of Salutius) is a problematization of the pederastic norms of ἐραστής and ἐρώμενος as the asymmetry that was generally asserted for these relationships is not present. The erasure of asymmetry that this Platonic allusion brings to the fore fits with Julian’s elsewhere attested interest in not insisting on personal grandeur and sharply-marked status distinctions in his relations with intimates (discussed above) and it also harmonizes with Julian’s drive to equalize the friendship through the invocation of τὸ ἀνάλογον (“what is proportionate”) as Aristotle puts it (*Eth. Nic.* 9.1.1163B 29f.; also discussed above). A picture of symmetrical desire between adult males emerges from this moment of intertextuality. My suggestion that such desire is perceptible may impress some present readers as unwarranted. I offer again the final words of a passage discussed above (and which were the frontispiece of this article) in support of

the idea that this desire in fact is visible (my second offering, a discussion of why Julian might want to suggest the presence of same-sex and age-consonant desire, will appear in the conclusion of this article):

. . . ἢ τούτους [sc. μιμητέοι λόγοι] μὲν ἅτε δὴ μείζονας καὶ περὶ μείζόνων οὐ κινητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ μικρῷ μηχανὰς μεγάλας . . .

(Julian. *Or.* 3.244A)

. . . or are these [words to be acted out], inasmuch as they are greater and are about greater things, not to be set in motion, as though they were great stage machinery in a small theater . . .

Through these words Julian affects to regret his recollection of the *Charmides* in his own oration. These words, however, are difficult. Although Julian does offer an explanation—he calls the words to be acted out, the μιμητέοι λόγοι, expansive and concerned with weighty affairs, similar to stage machinery that will prove to be too large for the theater into which it has been put—and it is not clear what his (initially) abstracting and (subsequently) metaphorical language means. A generalizing statement about size? A sort of similarity to oversized stage machinery?

When Socrates remarks that he would like to strip the mind of Charmides rather than his body, he figures dialectic as foreplay and thereby embraces the physical at a figurative level. And then, shortly thereafter, the pretensions of the philosopher to a mode of speech sovereign enough to metaphorize dialectic as foreplay are themselves stripped away. After the physical has asserted itself, an at best inconclusive discussion of σωφροσύνη eventuates: the body arguably wins in this dialogue (although the existence of his own irony will ever immunize Socrates from a charge of intemperance or ἀκράτεια³⁸). In similar fashion Julian makes reference to this story from the Platonic corpus but then declares that it is unable to play its role as a metaphor for his grief, presumably similar to the way stage machinery that is too big for a small theater destroys the illusion on stage and attracts all credence to itself. Julian says here that the mechanism he uses to metaphorize his grief will not, under the present circumstances, stably remain a medium of representation but will instead designate itself and thereby express actual male/male desire: the use of sexual desire as a mode of representation fails as signifier and signified are rendered identical. Indeed, the reader of Aristophanes’ story in the *Symposium* will recall that Zeus gave the comfort of sexual intercourse to the beings that he had sliced

³⁸ Julian is well-aware of Socratic irony. In *Oration 7* (24/237B) Julian notes that Socrates is by his nature ironic (ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρων ὃν φύσει).

in half through the μηχανή of moving the genitals to the front.³⁹ This change of bodily morphology—a μηχανή just as the stage machines Julian mentions are μηχαναί—enabled both sex between men and women and that between men and men, as Plato goes on to say (*Smp.* 191C). Furthermore, Julian indirectly says here that Socrates' ironic pose in relation to such physical incitements is not one that Julian can strike and he thus cannot measure up to the accomplishments of his philosophical forebear. At this moment, at least, philosophical distance and ironic detachment are not his possessions. He seems to let his mask slip, as it were, and the reader wonders whether Julian is really feeling desire. As previously stressed, I do not regard the appearance of desire here, in the first place, as saying anything definitive about what Julian and Salutius may have done with one another. Second—and this issue is independent of the first, no matter what the facts of the case are—Julian uses an apparent confession of inability in the face of desire as yet another strategy in his ongoing presentation to all who would read or hear this oration that his friendship and alliance with Salutius is a special thing. This will not be the only occasion when Julian uses same-sex sexual erotics in this way.

Later in the oration, a similar dynamic attends the speech Julian puts in the mouth of Pericles. When the speech of this golden-age figure concludes, the words Julian offers *in sua persona* constitute another moment in which Julian showcases his inability to accomplish what a forebear is able to accomplish—and, significantly, it is again a seeming failure of sublimation in the face of male/male erotics.

Pericles' Ability and Julian's Inability

The end of the speech of Pericles climaxes with what we can read as an anachronistic replay of Plato's "ladder of love" from the *Symposium*. Here is this passage from Pericles' speech to Anaxagoras in Julian's oration:

κωλύει δὲ οὐδὲν καὶ ἅμα βλέπειν ἀλλήλους, οὐχὶ σαρκία καὶ νεῦρα καὶ μορφῆς τύπωμα, στέρνα τε ἐξεικασμένα' πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον σώματος (καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο κωλύει τυχὸν οὐδὲν ταῖς διανοίαις ἡμῶν ἐμφαίνεσθαι), ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας καὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, ὡς πολλάκις ἐποίησάμεθα μετ' ἀλλήλων, οὐκ ἀμούσως ὑμνοῦντες παιδείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸν ἐπιτροπεύοντα νοῦν τὰ θνητὰ καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ περὶ πολιτείας καὶ νόμων καὶ τρόπων ἀρετῆς καὶ χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων διεξιόντες, ὅσα γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐν καιρῷ τούτων μεμνημένοι. Ταῦτα ἐννοοῦντες, τούτοις

³⁹ Plato, *Smp.* 191B: ἐλεήσας δὲ ὁ Ζεὺς ἄλλην μηχανὴν πορίζεται, καὶ μετατίθησιν αὐτῶν τὰ αἰδοῖα εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν . . . ("Filled with pity [for the separated beings who were dying of grief] Zeus devised another μηχανή and he moved their genitals to the front . . .").

στρεφόμενοι τοῖς εἰδώλοις, τυχὸν οὐκ ὄνειρων νυκτερινῶν ἰνδάλμασι προσέξομεν, οὐδὲ κενὰ καὶ μάταια προσβαλεῖ τῷ νῷ φαντάσματα πονηρῶς ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κράσεως αἴσθησις διακειμένη. Οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν παραληψόμεθα τὴν αἴσθησιν ὑπουργεῖν ἡμῖν καὶ ὑπηρετεῖσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἀποφυγῶν αὐτὴν ὁ νοῦς ἐμμελετήσῃ τούτοις πρὸς κατανόησιν καὶ συνεθισμόν τῶν ἀσωμάτων διεγειρόμενος· νῷ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τῷ κρείττονι σύνεσμεν, καὶ τὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποφυγόντα καὶ διεστηκότα τῷ τόπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ δεόμενα τόπου ὄραν τε καὶ ἐρᾶν πεφύκαμεν, ὅσοις ἀξίως βεβίωται τῆς τοιαύτης θέας, ἐννοοῦντες αὐτὴν καὶ συναπτόμενοι.

(Julian. *Or.* 4.5.247C-248B)

But at the same time nothing prevents our seeing each other [although we may be apart]; I do not mean our flesh and sinews and “bodily outline and chest in the likeness” [Eur. *Phoen.* 162] of the bodily original—though perhaps there is no reason why these too should not become visible in our minds—but I mean our virtue, our deeds and words (λόγους), the intercourse and conversations that we so often had with one another, when in perfect harmony we sang the praises of education and justice and the mind governing mortal and human affairs; when too we discussed the art of government and laws (νόμων), the ways of virtue, and the noblest practices (ἐπιτηδευμάτων), everything in short that occurred to us when, as occasion served, we mentioned these subjects. Thinking on these things, nourishing ourselves on these images [of such abstract notions as virtue or government], perhaps we will not give ourselves over to the images of nocturnal dreams and sense perception (shamefully composed from the body’s physical constitution) will not attack the mind with empty and vain visions (φαντάσματα). We will not allow sense perception to serve and labor for us. Having fled sense perception, the mind will practice those things I have mentioned, motivated for the observation of and habituation to those things that are incorporeal. By means of mind we commune with he who is greater and [by means of mind] we were born to see and love/desire (ἐρᾶν) things that have fled sense perception and are widely separated in space, or, I should say, that have no need of space: that is to say, all of us who have lived so as to deserve such a vision, conceiving it in our minds and uniting ourselves with it.⁴⁰

Pericles proceeds in familiar Platonic terms as he starts from the individual body (his and Anaxagoras’) and then proceeds to draw a picture of ever more secure investment in virtues more and more disembodied. Enlightened in this way, a man thereby possesses an ability both to remain impassive to bodily stimuli and to avoid, it would seem, nocturnal emissions. The privileging of mind over sense perception is underscored and humanity’s highest goal is found in the intellection of things incorporeal and transcendent, and, indeed, in the love of these things (which reinscribes the fact that the springboard of this transcendence is desire).

Certainly perceptible to all who would have had the benefit of the *paideia* in late antiquity, the resemblance between this passage and the so-called “ladder

⁴⁰ Wright [2] 185-87 (adapted).

of love” in the *Symposium* (210A-211C) is strong. Present in both Julian’s and Plato’s writing is the conversion of interest focused on a single male body into a broader investment in the institutions of society. The final phrases that Julian gives to Pericles (e.g., the references to desired incorporealities that need no space at all) nicely adumbrate “the vast sea of beauty” (τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος . . . τοῦ καλοῦ, *Smp.* 210D) Diotima proposes for a successful sublimator in the *Symposium*. There are perceptible verbal echoes too. Julian speaks of λόγοι (247D), νόμοι (248A) and ἐπιτηδεύματα (248A) which we may correlate with Plato’s mention of λόγοι (210A, 210C, 210D, 211A), νόμοι (210C), and ἐπιτηδεύματα (210C [twice], 210D, 211C [twice]).

Pericles’ version of the ladder of love shows some difference from Plato’s though. On the way up to beauty’s vast sea, the striving climber clambers out onto the ledge of asceticism and self-mastery for a time—a detour that surely indicates the late-ancient provenance of these words. And this impression of a late-ancient provenance is redoubled by the seeming mention of erotic dreams with nocturnal emissions (“images of nocturnal dreams . . . empty and vain visions”), which were a concern in the writings on dreams, in medical treatises, and in discussions of practicalities of Christian asceticism in late antiquity.⁴¹

I will now demonstrate that nocturnal emissions are arguably perceptible in the passage through a brief survey of these literatures. The benefit of making this demonstration is that it shows Julian praising Pericles’ ability to rise above the distractions of the body, while he (Julian) continues to be assailed by φαντάσματα that are arguably causing nocturnal emissions whose impetus is *Salutius*. Here, for reference, is the passage in which Pericles remarks that devotion to abstract things of virtue will enable him and Anaxagoras to avoid being influenced by these nightly dreams:

Τὰυτα ἐννοοῦντες, τούτοις στρεφόμενοι τοῖς εἰδώλοις, τυχὸν οὐκ ὄνειρων νυκτερινῶν ἰνδάλμασι προσέξομεν, οὐδὲ κενὰ καὶ μάταια προσβαλεῖ τῷ νῶ φαντάσματα πονηρῶς ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κράσεως αἰσθησις διακειμένη.

(Julian. *Or.* 4.5.248A)

Thinking on these things, nourishing ourselves on these images [of such abstract notions as virtue or government], perhaps we will not give ourselves over to the images of nocturnal dreams (ὄνειρων νυκτερινῶν ἰνδάλμασι)

⁴¹ Both Wright [2] 185 and Bidez [2] 199 report that the phrase, ὄνειρων νυκτερινῶν ἰνδάλμασι (“images of nocturnal dreams”) was designated by Nauck as a quotation from an anonymous tragedy (fr. 108). If there is intertextuality with an unknown tragedy here, a relation whose force is utterly lost to us now, this relation does not vitiate the power of the other surrounding words that speak of the shameful effects of the body on the imagination. This passage remains, in any case, intertextual with the literature on erotic dreams.

and sense perception (shamefully [πονηρῶς] composed from the body’s physical constitution) will not attack the mind with empty and vain visions (κενὰ καὶ μάταια . . . φαντάσματα).

In the first place, the final phrase Pericles uses here, “empty and vain visions,” can be associated with erotic dreams that one has while sleeping. In a lengthy work from the second century CE on the interpretation of dreams, the *Oneirokritika*, Artemidorus is concerned with the meaning that dreams can be said to have. Not all dreams, however, are meaningful; Artemidorus finds that some of them, which he calls ἐνύπνια, merely reflect the current preoccupations of a person when he or she goes to bed: an ἐνύπνιον is, he says, ἀσήμαντον καὶ οὐδενὸς προαγορευτικόν (“meaningless and predicative of nothing,” *Oneirokritika* 4 *praef.* 65). Artemidorus remarks further of the ἐνύπνιον as follows:

. . . γινόμενον δὲ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίας ἀλόγου ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντος φόβου ἢ πλησμονῆς ἢ ἐνδείας τροφῆς, ἐνύπνιον χρῆ καλεῖν.
(Artem. *Oneirokritika* 4 *praef.* 66-68)

It is necessary to say that an *enupnion* comes about from an irrational desire or an overwhelming fear or satiety or lack of food.

An ἐνύπνιον either is an emanation of the non-rational part of the mind (and is, presumably, indicative of physical desire) or it is a figment arising from the current needs or concerns of the body.⁴² One might go so far to say that an ἐνύπνιον is “shamefully composed from the body’s physical constitution.” Artemidorus speaks elsewhere of ἐνύπνια, their connection to waking life, and how they can cause physical manifestations, called ὄνειρωγμοί, in the dreamer:

ταύτη γὰρ ὄνειρος ἐνύπνιον διαφέρει, ἢ συμβέβηκε τῷ μὲν εἶναι σημαντικῶ τῶν μελλόντων, τῷ δὲ τῶν ὄντων. σαφέστερον δ’ ἂν μάθοις οὕτω. τὰ ποιά τῶν παθῶν προσανατρέχειν πέφυκε καὶ προσανατάσσειν ἑαυτὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τοὺς ὄνειρωγμοὺς ἀποτελεῖν. οἷον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἐρῶντα ὄναρ ἅμα τοῖς παιδικοῖς εἶναι δοκεῖν καὶ τὸν δεδιότα ὄραν ἅ δέδιε, καὶ πάλιν αὖ τὸν πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν καὶ τὸν διψῶντα πίνειν . . .
(Artemidorus, *Oneirokritika* 1.1.5-12)

The *enupnion* differs from a dream in this way: it happens that the dream signifies future events while the *enupnion* signifies things in the present. But if you would learn about this with more clarity, [observe] certain of the passions by nature retrace [the day’s events], draw up beside the soul, and they bring *oneirōgmoi* to fruition such that the lover, as he dreams, seems of necessity to

⁴² For more commentary on “meaningless” ἐνύπνια in Artemidorus, see P. C. Miller, *Dreams in Late Antiquity: Studies in the Imagination of a Culture* (Princeton 1994) 47, 80f.; A. Pomeroy, “Status and Status-Concern in the Greco-Roman Dream-Books,” *Ancient Society* 22 (1991) 59, 67.

be together with his boyfriend; the one who has been in a state of fear seems to see what he fears; and, again, the hungry one seems to eat and the thirsty one seems to drink . . .

There are two things to understand from these remarks. In the first place, Artemidorus' assertion that ἐνύπνια are manifestations whose origin is the day's experiences recalls Aristotle's characterization of the general nature of dreams. In *De Insomniis*, Aristotle maintains that the vast majority of dreams come from physical disturbances left over in the various sensory organs of the body from waking activities and thoughts; the images seen in dreams are mere after-images.⁴³ The reader once again may remember "sense perception (shamefully composed from the body's physical constitution) . . . attack[ing] the mind with empty and vain visions." Hence, then, both the conceptual emptiness of the visions Pericles mentions and their basis in the body can be connected to Artemidorus and Aristotle on dreams.

Before leaving this passage from the *Oneirokritika*, there is the second point to make (and it will function as a bridge to a consideration of the light shed by the medical literature on what Julian says). Artemidorus sees these dreams as bringing about actual physical effects in the dreamer. The lover, for example, will dream of his boyfriend and this is an ὄνειρωγμός. It is difficult to decide precisely what Artemidorus means here—both because he does not specify precisely what the relationship between the ἐνύπνιον and the ὄνειρωγμός is and because ὄνειρωγμοί also arise, according to Artemidorus,

⁴³ See, e.g., *De Insomniis* 459A 23-28: Τί δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν ὕπνον συμβαινόντων μάλιστα ἂν θεωρήσασκεν. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν ("What a dream is, and how it occurs, we may best study from the circumstances attending sleep. For sense-objects corresponding to each sense-organ provide us with perception. And the affection produced by them persists in the sense-organs, not only while the perceptions are being actualized, but also after they have gone," D. Gallop [ed. and tr.], *Aristotle on Sleep and Dreams* [Peterborough 1990] 87); and 461A 25-30: καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενου τοῦ αἵματος ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις, σφζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἢ κίνησις ἀφ' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων εἰρόμενά τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια, καὶ φαίνεσθαί τι καὶ δοκεῖν διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καταφερόμενα ὄραν, διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν, ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων . . . ("When in sanguineous animals the blood has subsided and its purer elements have separated off, the movement of sense-impressions persisting from each of the sense-organs makes the dreams coherent. Thus something is made to appear, and because of effects carried inward from vision one judges that one is seeing, or because of those from hearing, that one is hearing; and so on similarly for those from the other senses," Gallop [above, this note] 95). Cf. 460A32-B3, 461B21-23; see also Miller [42] 42-44.

from daytime fear, hunger and thirst⁴⁴—but the definition of *ὄνειρωγμός* as a dream with a seminal emission would have been well known to those familiar with medical literature.⁴⁵ In any case, *ἐνόπνια* and the *ὄνειρωγμοί* are germane to this discussion because of the asserted connection between “empty” images and physical manifestations—a connection in the face of which Pericles expresses his power and Julian confesses his weakness.

The fifth-century writer of *On Chronic Diseases*, Caelius Aurelianus (whose work is a Latin translation of a Greek text by Soranus who lived two or three centuries earlier), discusses nocturnal emissions at 5.7 and the terms he uses in his discussion recall those of Artemidorus, Aristotle, and, as is my assertion, Julian. A dream with a nocturnal emission is, Caelius says, an *onyrogmos*.⁴⁶ Caelius also believes that wet dreams are indicative of poor health. He says, *per somnos inanibus visis adfecti aegrotantes seminis lapsu vexantur* (“those ill-ones affected by empty/vain visions (*inanibus visis*) during sleep are troubled by the emission of seed,” *On Chronic Diseases* 5.7.80).⁴⁷ This phrase is familiar by now; conceptual emptiness is once again associated with sexual arousal that, in this case, explicitly climaxes with the emission of semen. Caelius later suggests, too, that it may be necessary to take action to cause the emissions to cease:

quapropter convenit primo aegrotanti ab intentione veneria visa mentis
avertere, quae Graeci phantasmata vocaverunt.

(Caelius, *On Chronic Diseases* 5.7.83)

⁴⁴ I will simply note here that I find it difficult to decide how dreams of fear, hunger, and thirst will be of a kind with dreams based in sexual desire—especially when the possibility of the evidence of seminal emission is taken into consideration.

⁴⁵ There are a number of words which are associated with nocturnal emissions in the medical literature (and elsewhere). See *LSJ* for the following words (all of which recall the words Julian uses [*ὄνειρων νυκτερινῶν ἰνδάλμασι*): *ἐξονειριασμός*; *ἐξονειρωγμός*; *ὄνειρωγμός*; *ὄνειρωξις* II; *ἐξονειρωξις*. See too the remarks of D. Brakke, “The Problematization of Nocturnal Emissions in Early Christian Syria, Egypt, and Gaul,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 3 (1995) 423f.; T. Vivian, “‘Everything Made by God is Good,’” *Église et Théologie* 24 (1993) 93; K. Russell, “John Cassian on a Delicate Subject,” *Cistercian Studies Quarterly* 27 (1992) 1-12; J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York 1990) 92f.; and J. Pigeaud, “La Rêve Érotique dans l’Antiquité Gréco-Romaine: l’Oneirogmos,” *Littérature, Médecine, Société* 3 (1981) 10-23.

⁴⁶ The spelling change is clearly an effect of the translation of this word from Greek into Latin. Caelius Aurelianus entitles the section on wet dreams as follows: *De Somno Venerio, Quem Graeci Onyrogmon Appellant* (“On the erotic dream, which the Greeks call the *onyrogmos*,” *On Chronic Diseases* 5.7.80). See I. Drabkin (ed. and tr.), *Caelius Aurelianus: On Acute Diseases and On Chronic Diseases* (Chicago 1950) 958.

⁴⁷ Drabkin [46] 958.

Therefore [if nocturnal emissions are occurring] it will suit, in the first place to turn the ailing man's mental images away from preoccupation with sex, which [images] the Greeks call *phantasmata*.⁴⁸

Phantasmata are erotic dreams that lead to nocturnal emissions and they need controlling. There is mental work for the man to do. In addition to the mention of *phantasmata* here (note that *phantasmata* are that which Julian's Pericles says he will be able to resist), Caelius twice mentions *phantasiae* (5.7.80, 81), which are often synonymous with *phantasmata*⁴⁹ and a term which is often used of the wet dreams in other literature.

In contrast to this concern with a man's mental state as a powerful contributing factor in wet dreams, the fourth-century medical writer, Oribasius, recommends a proper diet so that the soul will not have to endure the commission of a seminal emission. Didactically addressing the male reader, he observes that if you do what he says:

τοὺς ὕπνους δ' ἠδίονας ἂν εὖροις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἐκταρασσομένην ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους φαντασιῶν.

(*Collectiones Medicae* 9.17.5)

You will find sleep more pleasant and your soul will not be harassed by wet dreams.

Oribasius enunciates here a position that emissions are primarily a physical phenomenon—it is a matter of eating properly—but it is better for the soul that the emissions not occur. Proper diet will prevent shameful episodes that have their basis in the body's constitution.

We also find discussion of erotic dreams and seminal emissions in literature associated with Christian asceticism. As is the case with the doctors, vocabulary and concepts have commonality with what Julian's Pericles has to say. A little background on the various views of nocturnal emissions is necessary to establish that emissions were an object of debate and that this debate had a degree of prominence.

Broadly addressing writings on wet dreams in Christian ascetic literature, Brakke remarks:

[O]n the immediate question [about the status of nocturnal emissions], Christians held nearly every conceivable position: some believed that such emissions were always defiling, others that they were never so, and still others that some emissions were defiling, and some not.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Drabkin [46] 961 (adapted).

⁴⁹ *LSJ*: φαντάσμα II.

⁵⁰ Brakke [45] 420f.

Initially among Christians, there was reluctance to declare a nocturnal emission defiling, as this was the Old Testament Jewish view of the matter:⁵¹ the early Christians took pains to take positions on questions that were distinct from those that Jews held. This reluctance gave way in time as the Christians became more secure. One thing that kept this reluctance from breaking down entirely in ascetic circles was the worry that a monk, over-fastidious, would stay away from church services, or synaxes, and so deprived of the Eucharist be rendered easier prey for the Devil. Such was the opinion of the powerful fourth-century bishop Athanasius in his *Letter to Amun*.⁵² The position that became dominant, however (and which constituted a rejection of Athanasius’ position), was one that was ambivalent about nocturnal emissions. Nocturnal emissions could sometimes be merely a physical shedding of excess that was morally indifferent but other times, when they occurred in the company of sexual imagery, they were the object of moralizing regard. In the late fourth-century *Constitutiones Apostolorum*, for example, we discover a distinction between emissions that are γονόρροιαι (“sheddings”) and wet dreams which are known as ὄνειρώξεις (6.27)⁵³ the latter of which certainly recalls the words that Pericles/Julian uses when he refers to “nocturnal dreams.” It was important that a man decide which of the two had occurred. This position that any nocturnal emission would need further consideration also appears in the anonymous *Historia Monachorum* (circa 400 CE). In the relevant section, the Abba Dioscurus commands that any monk who has had a nocturnal emission while dreaming of a woman (ἐν γυναικὸς φαντασίᾳ, 20.3-4) may not come to synaxis but the monk whose release of semen was without dreams and involuntary (ἄνευ τῶν φαντασιῶν . . . αὐτομάτως, 20.6) could. The will was implicated in the case of the former and not in the case of the latter. Dioscurus remarks that, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἔρχονται καὶ τῆς κακῆς γνώμης ἐστὶ τεκμήριον (“*phantasiai* come from the will and are proof of a sinful frame of mind,” *Historia Monachorum* 20.9-10).

My assertion here is that a plausible reception of Pericles’ remarks when he speaks about “images of nocturnal dreams . . . empty and vain visions” would have featured thoughts similar to those we find in these authoritative discourses: dream analysis, medicine, and asceticism. Furthermore, Pericles’ position is similar to those who see a (possibly shameful) weakness in the body (e.g., Artemidorus, Aristotle, Oribasius, Athanasius) but it also has some commonalities with those who counsel that sexual thoughts should be a concern (e.g., Caelius Aurelianus, the *Constitutiones Apostolorum*, Dioscurus in the

⁵¹ See, e.g., *Le.* 15.16f. and *De.* 23.11f.; see also Brakke [45] 421f., 424-30.

⁵² See discussions by Vivian [45] 75-108; Brakke [45] 442-44.

⁵³ Cf. Brakke [45] 430.

Historia Monachorum)—sublimation is a goal he pursues, after all. Pericles' flat-out negativity about the body sets him apart from some of the Christian notions I have referred to here but the worry with the mind and its passions and thoughts certainly recalls the concerns we see in the Christianized ascetic literature with its injunctions to self-examination. We may like to say that Pericles has arrived at the desirable place adumbrated by Dioscurus in the *Historia Monachorum*: Pericles' mind, organized properly, will pay the emissions no mind because there is no issue.

Following directly on these words he has given to Pericles, Julian resumes speaking in his own voice. This resumption of Julian speaking *in sua persona* is a powerful move that creates the impression that this is a moment of true confession, whatever the truth (forever inaccessible to us) may be. As we will shortly see, Julian showcases his inability to do what Pericles does and so, on the basis of both the emergence of something seeming to be more real and the confession of inability, the reader can associate this moment in the speech with the prior destruction of mimesis by the too-great stage-machinery in a theater. In both cases Julian has abandoned a representational dynamic for a confession of inability:

Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς, ἄτε δὴ μεγαλόφρων ἀνὴρ καὶ τραφεὶς ἐλεύθερος ἐν ἐλευθέρῃ τῇ πόλει, ὑψηλοτέροις ἐψυχαγῶγει λόγοις αὐτόν· ἐγὼ δέ, γεγρονῶς ἐκ τούτων 'οἴοι νῦν βροτοὶ εἰσιν', ἀνθρωπικωτέροις ἐμαυτὸν θέλω καὶ παράγω λόγοις καὶ τὸ λίαν πικρὸν ἀφαιρῶ τῆς λύπης, πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ἀεὶ μοι προσπιπτόντων ἀπὸ τοῦ πράγματος δυσχερῶν τε καὶ ἀτόπων φαντασμάτων ἐφαρμόζειν τινὰ παραμυθίαν πειρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπώδην θηρίου δήγματι δάκνοντος αὐτὴν ἔσω τὴν καρδίαν ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς φρένας.

(Julian. *Or.* 4.6.248C-D)

But Pericles, inasmuch as he was great-hearted and raised free in a free city, ministered to his own soul with loftier words. I, on the other hand, born from the kind of “mortals such as live now” [*Iliad* 5.304], must beguile and encourage myself with arguments more human; and thus I take away the excessive bitterness of my pain, trying as I do to fashion some consolation—like a charm against some wild beast that is gnawing into both my very heart and viscera—[some consolation] for each of the hard-to-handle and strange visions (φαντασμάτων) always assailing me in the present situation.⁵⁴

Julian says that the strategies Pericles employed are not ones that will work for him. He does not have his glorious predecessor's ability to transcend the physical, a point that he underscores by reference to the *Iliad*. In a battle scene in book five, Diomedes hefts a rock that men of the current day would never be able to lift: ὁ δὲ χερμάδιον λάβει χειρὶ / Τυδεΐδης μέγα ἔργον ὃ οὐ δύο γ'

⁵⁴ Wright [2] 187 (adapted).

ἄνδρε φέροιεν, / οἶοι νῦν βροτοί εἶσ’ ὃ δέ μιν ῥέα πάλλε καὶ οἶος
 (“Tydeus’ son took in his hand a boulder—a great deed which not even two men, such as men are now, could do. But he hurled it easily, such was he,” 5.302-04). This reference looks forward to Julian’s statement later in the passage of his *aporia* in the face of the physical where he admits that he battles on even as φαντάσματα continue to plague him—φαντάσματα starring Salutius and capable of producing nocturnal emissions?

And so Julian draws a picture of his regard for Salutius that we may rightly call desire of one adult male for another. There is in the first case the arguable presentation of wet dreams as caused by the longing for his friend. But there is more, as has been seen. Julian primes the reader to read in this way by the earlier intertextuality with Theocritus and Plato. While it is true that these intertextualities can be understood as being of a piece with other late-ancient figurations of male/male friendship, the difference here is Julian’s embrace of the real: “stage-machinery destroys mimesis” and “I cannot measure up to the men of the past and these dreams assault me.” On my reading, Julian rejects the deployment of male/male desire as merely metaphorical. The question at this point is why Julian would want to assert what may impress some readers as unlikely and still other readers as outrageous.

Conclusion

I believe that whatever the truth of the nature of the relationship between Julian and Salutius (and beyond what I say here, there is nothing that I think we can say for certain), what we can say is that we have an excessive moment, a moment of rhetorical hyperbole that identifies Salutius as special. As indicated above, this conclusion may strike some readers as unwarranted. How can an emperor confess to or leave the impression of something that conceivably could engender a cat-call of *cinaede*/κίνοιδε? In the first place, I go where the evidence takes me and the call we may hear may be for some readers to examine what they think they know for certain about the ancient world. But such a response on my part is not sufficient (and perhaps more polemical than persuasive). And to that end, I will offer further thoughts as to why Julian may have liked to cut things so close to the bone, as it were.

In evaluating a claim such as this, a reader should, in the first place, remember that Julian is merely upping the stakes already present in other late ancient contexts—contexts in which erotic tropes define friendships and connections between men. Furthermore, in contemplating the spectacle of homoerotic behavior in high places being employed as a way to designate the strength of a public alliance, a reader may find a historical comparison persuasive. Bray discusses the ways in which George Villiers (later Duke of

Buckingham) and James I of England figured their political alliance in terms that suggest not-so-covert homosexuality. In a letter from 1623, which reacts to James' making Villiers the Duke of Buckingham (and he was the first commoner so honored in over 100 years⁵⁵), Villiers compares the king's beneficence to a hand that will bring him off:

There is this difference betwixt that noble hand and hart, one may surfit by the one, but not by the other, and soner by yours then his one, therefore give me leave to stope with mine, that hand which hath bine but tow redie to execute the motions and affections of that kind obligeing hart to me.⁵⁶

This letter is not a peculiarity in the context of their relations. Writing one last letter just before the end of his life to the Duke in 1624, James says that he wants to make a “new marriage” with the Duke and he calls himself the Duke's “husband.”⁵⁷ Letters such as these were not private documents—they would have been shown to others and they would have shown the world the power of bonds between certain men and, in this case, the esteem in which James held Buckingham.⁵⁸ It is in this way that I suggest that we view the instances of same-sex desire and Julian's varied confessions of it in *Oration 4*, for it is surely certain that this oration did not merely disappear into a drawer. As is well established—a fact to which the numerous *progymnasmata* and rhetorical treatises attest⁵⁹—there were numerous opportunities for oral performance of a heavily figured speech in the later empire. Furthermore, not only performance was possible, there was a diffusion of written versions of orations. In the case of the two praise-orations Julian wrote to Constantius II and the one to the empress Eusebia, oral performance is posited and it is generally agreed that the orations were sent over the Alps to the court in Milan.⁶⁰ Similarly, the Justinianic historian Malalas reports that the text of the *Misopogon* was posted on the

⁵⁵ See A. Bray, *The Friend* (Chicago 2003) 171f. for more discussion of the circumstances surrounding this letter.

⁵⁶ Bray [55] 166.

⁵⁷ Bray [55] 96.

⁵⁸ Bray [55] 100f.

⁵⁹ Readers interested in the importance of rhetoric in the later empire may start with the following: V. Burrus, “*Begotten, Not Made*”: *Conceiving Manhood in Late Antiquity* (Stanford 2000) 18-22; M. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton 1995) *passim*; Brown [16] *passim*; A. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley 1991) *passim*; and G. Kennedy, *Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors* (Princeton 1983) *passim*.

⁶⁰ S. Tougher, “In Praise of an Empress: Julian's *Speech of Thanks to Eusebia*,” in M. Whitby (ed.), *The Propaganda of Power: The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity* (Leiden 1998) 107-10.

Tetrapylon of the Elephants in Antioch for all to read (*Chron.* 328.3-4⁶¹). While we have no evidence of which I am aware for oral performance of *Oration* 4 or for a subsequent circulation of the written version, it is reasonable to suppose a similar dynamic of performance and diffusion. Thinking further about diffusion, it is intriguing to think of the oration as functioning in a fashion similar to that of a letter from a *Caesar* or emperor.

Julian mentions in a letter to a certain Philip, about whom little is known, that recipients of letters from members of the imperial family have been known to abuse them:

Καὶ ἴσως ἔχει μὲν τι πρὸς τὸ γαυριᾶν καὶ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἢ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐπίδειξις, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἀσυνήθεις ὥσπερ δακτύλιοί τινες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπειροκόλων φερόμενοι κομίζωνται.

(*Ep.* 40/30; Bidez and Wright⁶²)

Then, too, letters from the emperor to private persons might well lead to their display for bragging and making false pretences when they come into the hands of persons with no sense of propriety, who carry them about like seal-rings and show them to the inexperienced.⁶³

While Julian reprehends the behavior of those with no sense of propriety in this letter, the letter also attests to a practice of displaying such letters from a *Caesar* or an emperor in the interests of raising the status of the recipient.⁶⁴ Addressing his friend in ways that do not lack for epistolary aspects, this oration, I suggest, would have been quite a calling-card for Salutius.

As history shows, Salutius was most active later in the reign of Julian in various ways, including presiding at the trials at Chalcedon, when Julian settled some scores in the process of establishing his rule, and holding the office of Praetorian Prefect of the East.⁶⁵ Interestingly, too, when Julian was killed on the ill-fated campaign against Persia, the troops initially favored Salutius to be the next emperor (Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res Gestae* 25.5.3). Rosen suggests that

⁶¹ M. Gleason, “Festive Satire: Julian’s *Misopogon* and the New Year at Antioch,” *JRS* 76 (1986) 106.

⁶² Bidez [2 (1924)]; Wright [2].

⁶³ Wright [2] 105.

⁶⁴ Julian could also have in mind “rescripts” or letters certifying that an emperor favoured a petition at some point. J. Harries, *Law and Empire in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge 1999) *passim* but 20f. discusses the range of communications from emperors in legal situations.

⁶⁵ Salutius held the office of Praetorian Prefect of the East from 361 to 365, and therefore beyond the reign of Julian (who died in 363). Relieving him in 365, Valens reappointed him within months because of the usurpation of Procopius. Salutius finally retired in 367. For more on the later career of Salutius, see Gutsfeld [5]; Jones [6] 814-17; Lenski [16] 106f.; and N. Lenski, “The Election of Jovian and the Role of the Late Imperial Guards,” *Klio* 82 (2000) 492-96.

he was seen by the troops to embody best the glamour of the Constantinian Dynasty.⁶⁶ As he did not have the blood of Constantine in his veins, I suggest that we entertain the notion that his nearly becoming emperor was at least to some extent a function of his closeness to Julian. Salutius was, it would seem, the closest of Julian's many male friends and the oration written before the imperial adventure truly commenced indicates as much. I am not asserting that they were homosexual lovers but what I am asserting is that Julian presents their friendship in terms of sexual desire and thereby suggests a special closeness and importance that was legible to others. Julian affects to be making revelations and his rhetoric plays with reality to make his point in the strongest terms possible. That he does this provides important information about desire among adult males and about the perceived connection of same-sex desire to male friendship in late antiquity.

⁶⁶ Rosen [9] 382.