The Chinese Pacifics: A Brief Historical Review

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CRITICAL SURVEY

The Chinese Pacifics: A Brief Historical Review

PAUL D’ARCY

ABSTRACT

This survey reviews the growing role and presence of China in the Island Pacific. As the late Professor Ron Crocombe remarked, in the Pacific a major transition is under way from a range of European to Asian influences. Many Western observers have viewed this rise of Asian, and specifically Chinese, influence with alarm, but Crocombe saw it as offering Pacific Islanders new opportunities. This paper first analyses the diversity that can be masked by terms such as ‘China’ and ‘the Pacific’. Then it surveys recent literature on China in the Pacific and scholarship concerned with longer Chinese histories in the region that most recent commentators ignore and which question a number of their assertions. Finally, it suggests possible future directions for historical research on this topic.

Key words: China, Taiwan, Pacific Islands, diaspora, development, international relations, historiography

In 2007, the late Ron Crocombe published Asia in the Pacific Islands: Replacing the West, where he declared that a ‘spectacular transition’ was under way in the Pacific Islands: from ‘overwhelmingly’ Western sources of external influence, ‘whether cultural, economic, political or other’, to Asian.1 While noting some concern about mutual misunderstanding and discrepancies in size between Asian giants and their Pacific Island neighbours, Crocombe was less alarmed by the prospect of a growing Asian presence than were many academic and governmental commentators from Australia, New Zealand and the USA. Rather, he saw this development as of potential benefit to Pacific Islanders, providing they remain flexible and attuned to new circumstances, new players and new opportunities.

Crocombe was on a wave of academic and government interest in Asian influence in the Island Pacific. Most of this interest has focused on the growing

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1 Ron Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands: replacing the West (Suva 2007), vii.
roles of the People’s Republic of China, and most seeks to assess the perceived Chinese threat to the interests of Island nations and their longstanding partners. Yet the term ‘Chinese’ covers a diverse assortment of ethnic and political entities. China, Taiwan, members of Chinese minorities from Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, and peoples of Chinese ancestry resident in the Pacific Islands, in some cases for generations, have attracted particular attention in the Pacific Islands over the last decade. Chinese influences, too, come in many forms: government diplomatic initiatives and aid, electronic media, large commercial enterprises, crime, migrants and actions by locals of Chinese heritage. In this paper, ‘China’ refers narrowly to the Peoples Republic of China, whereas the adjective ‘Chinese’ is used more broadly. ‘Chinese’ and ‘Pacific Islanders’ serve here as convenient umbrella terms that nevertheless mask great internal diversity. The paper’s title – ‘The Chinese Pacifics’ – deliberately reflects this diversity, and contrasts with the more usual, state-centred character of analysis dominated by approaches from international relations. Since little in Chinese has been written on the subject, this survey only treats Anglophone and Francophone literature, but includes work by Chinese authors in these languages.

While Crocombe was correct in pointing out that China was not the only rising Asian influence in the Pacific Islands, it is equally important to note that Asian influences in the Pacific Islands are uncoordinated and sometimes conflicted. Indeed, China’s burgeoning economic and international power has caused heightened tensions with its East and Southeast Asian neighbours over disputed islands and ocean areas such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. Many recent economic and political measures by Asian nations in the Pacific Islands have been prompted by events and strategic objectives within East and Southeast Asia.

This review first traces the upsurge in scholarship over the last decade on Chinese in the contemporary Pacific. It then demonstrates the disciplinary and temporal narrowness of most recent studies by outlining the breadth and depth of scholarship on the long history of diverse Chinese interactions with the Pacific Islands that is rarely cited or acknowledged by the more recent studies. This omission is partly because the rapid rise of Chinese influence in the Island Pacific was seen to coincide with a declining presence of the USA. Consequently scholars, primarily from international relations and strategic studies, focused on great power rivalry rather than the Pacific Islands themselves. I conclude by suggesting ways forward in research on this relatively neglected, but increasingly important aspect, of Pacific Islands history. I detail the content and approaches of the best works on Chinese in the Pacific Islands, alongside celebrated studies on the Chinese diaspora, in general,

2 Whereas ‘China’ is used here for the People’s Republic of China, ‘Taiwan’ stands for the Republic of China. This paper benefitted immensely from comments and feedback from Lewis Mayo, Graeme Smith, Stewart Firth, Pei-yi Guo, Yung-Chao Tung, Karen Kan-lan Tu, Denghua Zhang, Fei Sheng and the editors and referees of JPH, especially Vicki Luker.

3 The merging and interaction of Asian and Pacific national priorities and agendas in the Western Pacific are not discussed in detail here, but are the focus of another paper by the author to be published in the Pacific Currents section in 2015.
and in Southeast Asia, in particular, where historiography on the subject is rich and from where many recent Chinese arrivals into the Pacific are derived. I also suggest that the study of the Chinese Pacific can benefit from applying approaches that have been well developed within the discipline of Pacific history, and through collaborations that join scholars from the Anglophone, Francophone and Sinophone Pacifics.

**THE EMERGING CONSENSUS ON CHINA IN THE PACIFIC SINCE 2000**

Since 2000, certain media and academic commentators have blamed instability in the Islands on Chinese influence, and this blame has spotlighted China and local residents of Chinese ancestry. The numbers of Chinese people involved is very small. Ethnic Chinese generally comprise less than 1% of the total local population in any Pacific Island country. Crocombe estimated the total Chinese population in the Pacific Islands at circa 80,000 as of October 2006, including around 20,000 each in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, 15,000 in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, 14,000 in French Polynesia, and 4,000 in Guam. More Chinese have entered the Pacific since then, but precise figures are difficult to ascertain, since data collection in many Pacific Island nations is weak. Small and imprecise numbers notwithstanding, Chinese invariably figure prominently in business.

Most studies of Chinese in the Island Pacific to date follow the four-stage evolution of Chinese diaspora communities in the 19th and 20th centuries outlined by Wang Gungwu in his seminal analysis of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The first Chinese to go overseas in this period were *huashang*, or traders in search of commercial opportunities. Later in the 19th century, another type appeared, *huagong*, or overseas labourers, who worked mostly for non-Chinese companies. Then in the early-20th century, the *huaqiao*, or sojourners, established communities, often including both *huashang* and *huagong*, with continuing connections to the motherland. The fourth and final category of *huayi* emerged after 1980 and consists of Chinese who move freely across the global economy to take advantage of new opportunities. *Huayi* is a Mandarin term meaning ethnic Chinese that is particularly applied to ethnic Chinese with passports other than from China.

*Huayi* became conspicuous in the 1990s in the Pacific Islands. Many members of long-term Chinese communities in the Islands express concern about *huayi* lack of sensitivity to local ways, and are view them as disruptive competitors rather than as potential business and marriage partners. *Huayi* are distinguished from previous migrants by their weak ties to China and their high degree of mobility in the global economy that has emerged over the last three decades. While the businesses of more established Chinese are perceived as benefiting locals, those of *huayi* tend

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towards get-rich-quick enterprises such as logging, which bring little evident benefit to locals. Tensions also mounted over attempts by Chinese and Taiwanese government and business interests to buy support and win favour with local politicians. 6

Matters came to a head in 2006 with riots against Chinese businesses associated with unpopular governments in the Solomon Islands and Tonga. 7 The 2006 disturbances in Honiara and Nuku’alofa were also linked by many commentators to rivalry between Taiwan and China for influence among Pacific Island nations, and particularly to how ‘cheque-book’ diplomacy was destabilising domestic and regional politics. Six Pacific Island nations recognise Taiwan – Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru. The remaining eight Pacific Islands nations – the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu – recognise China. 9 Competition for influence in the Pacific Islands escalated in 2006 and 2007, when China, Taiwan and Japan announced major increases in their Pacific aid budgets and the USA publicly declared its intention to reverse years of relatively neglecting the Pacific. 10 Fortunately, sense prevailed and, since 2007, a possibly sustained and


escalating competition for influence in the Pacific through aid has not eventuated. The
global economic downturn made such competition increasingly unlikely. Relations
between China and Taiwan improved significantly from 2009.¹¹ Chinese–Taiwanese
tensions have been replaced by mounting tensions between Japan and China over the
disputed Senkaku/Daioyu Islands and between the USA and China over influence in
the Western Pacific in general.¹² As yet, none of these new tensions has disrupted
Pacific Island nations’ domestic politics or international relations.

By 2007, a clear division was apparent in the outlook of Western comment-
tators. On the one hand, commentators such as Australian journalist Graeme
Dobell expressed concern about China’s and Taiwan’s use of aid to secure exclu-
sive recognition from Pacific Island nations. As China has become increasingly
central to the global economy, the number of states recognising Taiwan has dimin-
ished. To this school of thought, China’s ‘unconditional’ aid is seen as destabilising
domestic and regional politics in the Pacific Islands, and potentially undermining
the leverage of established Western aid donors, given the relatively unattractive
guidelines of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
on transparency and accountability that accompany the latter.¹³
Taiwan’s financial efforts to retain diplomatic relations with those states recognising
it intensified the national importance of its Pacific funding priorities. Political
scientists Ben Reilly and John Henderson, and Lowy Institute researcher Fergus
Hanson all echoed these concerns about Chinese and Taiwanese dollar diplo-
macy.¹⁴

But others disagree. Scholars such as Terence Wesley-Smith, Greg Fry and
Tarcisius Kabutaulaka contrast China’s lack of interference in internal affairs and
refusal to comment on domestic policy in the Pacific Islands favourably with the
approach, characterised as patronising, from other aid donors such as Australia.
The Chinese practice of non-interference is also seen as providing an alternative to
free market philosophies underlying much aid conditionality from Western donors,
especially drives to cut government expenditure and substitute private-sector

¹³ Dobell, ‘China and Taiwan in the South Pacific’, 10, 18–19; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Paris 2010).
providers. Few of the critical assessments of China in the Pacific have sustained their analyses long enough to follow up on the concerns to which they initially drew government attention. For example, Hanson soon concluded that China was now potentially amenable to tutelage from Australia and other donors who had greater adherence to OECD principles, and was therefore worth approaching to seek collaborative and complementary aid objectives.

Chinese projects have drawn criticism about poor construction, a general reliance on crews brought in from China rather than locally recruited, poor labour conditions for local workers, and a preference to work with national governments rather than directly with affected communities, which consequently express grievance. The large size of certain Chinese projects has particularly raised concerns, especially in relatively remote and underdeveloped localities such as the Ramu mine site in inland Madang Province in Papua New Guinea, and the proposed mega-resort and casino complex planned for the Micronesian island of Yap in FSM. The Ramu mine – MCC Ramu NiCo Limited – has faced community opposition over labour conditions and inadequate environmental safeguards for the pipeline transferring slurry from the mine to port facilities in Basamuk Bay, and for provisions for slurry-dumping into the bay. The enormous size of the Chinese Exhibition and Travel Group’s (ETG) planned mega-resort on Yap has also prompted comment about local communities being overwhelmed and disrupted. Yap is renowned for the strength of customary ways. Its 9,000 residents only host 2,000 guests per year for dive tourism with manta rays. The ETG has applied for the right to develop multiple hotels totalling 10,000 bed capacity to host 4,000 tourists a day plus days ashore from large cruise ships. The mangrove-lined shore will host numerous marinas and the reef and lagoon near-shore environment will need significant dredging to prepare channels for the large cruise ships. Ten thousand staff will be needed to service the 4,000 guests per day, and most staff will have to speak Chinese to interact with guests. This 5 billion dollar project is being bankrolled by China’s Exim Bank.

17 Henderson and Reilly, ‘Dragon in paradise’; Hanson, ‘China: stumbling’; Hanson, ‘The dragon in the Pacific’.
Despite the obvious disruption that this will cause locally, it is still holds attraction, as the ETG has promised a major upgrade of all public amenities and services on Yap. FSM is also seeking viable alternative funding to replace the US Compact monies due to be phased out totally by 2023.19

A division of opinion between optimistic and more cautious conclusions was also apparent in 2007 in a second, related debate about the capacity of Pacific Island states to rectify their own problems. Many of those who express serious concerns about Chinese influence in the Pacific also publish gloomy prognoses about the ability of states within the so-called ‘arc of instability’ immediately north of Australia to make significant economic advances and secure political stability without external assistance. Their concern about Chinese influence in Pacific Island nations reflects the assumption that some of these are failed states. These commentators include Susan Windybank from the Centre for Independent Studies and Australian academic Ben Reilly.20 This school tends to define the state in terms of the centralised, bureaucratic and rule-bound ideal of Western democracies. By these criteria, most post-colonial states unsurprisingly ‘fail’. Their unity was created through colonial coercion and collaboration by a small local elite rather than through cultural coherence or multi-generational efforts to replace kin affiliation with loyalty to a territorial entity, as occurred in European nation states. Ironically, many Western nation states now seek to devolve state powers to local authorities to reflect better the diversity of interests and affiliations within their nations.

While many policy makers subscribe to this analysis of state failure, the majority of academic specialists on the Pacific have rejected or called for serious modification of the ‘arc of instability’ paradigm.21 They urge more acknowledgement of the highly inadequate preparation for independence that these nations received from colonial powers such as Australia, and are therefore less willing to blame flawed government practices and corruption since independence for today’s problems. They are also more cautious about the efficacy of applying foreign models to

Pacific problems. 22 In early 2007, the Australian National University published the proceedings of a conference on China in the Pacific that included contributions from a variety of perspectives and from most leading commentators at the time, including Dobell, Crocombe, academic expert on Chinese communities in the Pacific, Bill Willmott and Michael Powles, a former New Zealand ambassador to China whose family had long association with Samoa. 23 Overall, the collection argued for fewer condemnations of China until more research could be conducted. This collection was soon followed by similar arguments from Australian National University academics Hank Nelson and Paul D’Arcy, and from University of Hawai‘i academic Terence Wesley-Smith. 24 Nelson and Wesley-Smith strongly criticised assumptions apparent in works by Reilly and Dobell that underpinned doubts about Pacific Islanders’ capacity to avoid exploitation by Chinese interests. 25 D’Arcy and Powles also argued that negative assessments of China ran the risk of removing, at the outset, the possibility of exploring potential cooperation with China. 26

Following Crocombe’s volume, the 2010 collection Looking North, Looking South, edited by China specialist Anne-Marie Brady of Canterbury University, was the first comprehensive study to embrace both optimistic and pessimistic views of China’s influence in the Pacific. 27 The contributors, who were largely from political science and international relations, focused on Pacific Island interactions with China and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan. Crocombe contributed a chapter. Joel Atkinson thoughtfully analysed the implications of China’s rising influence for established regional powers such as New Zealand and provided one of the book’s few treatments of Taiwanese actions. Yet most contributors tended towards negative assessments of China.

Also published in 2010 was the collection edited by Terence Wesley Smith and Ed Porter, China in Oceania. It countered the threat discourse, focused more on the Islands, and departed from past analysis in containing three Pacific Islander commentators. They and the other ten contributors argued that those critical of Chinese actions in the Pacific underestimate the proactive nature and astute self-interest of Pacific Island governments in engaging with China. Wesley-Smith had first advanced this line in 2007. He and most Pacific Island specialists writing on Pacific Island–China relations argue

23 D’Arcy, ‘Chinese in the Pacific’.
27 Anne-Marie Brady (ed.), Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific (New Jersey 2010).
that China has allowed Pacific Islanders a greater degree of freedom of choice over aid donors than at any other time since independence by being the one significant donor not to insist on free market principles authorised by the so-called Washington Consensus, as conditions for development aid and loans.28

The following year, Auckland University international relations expert Jian Yang published *The Pacific Islands in China’s Grand Strategy*. This book was the first comprehensive analysis of China’s motivations in the Pacific Islands.29 Born and raised in China, Yang completed a PhD in international relations at Australian National University before joining Auckland in 1999.30 Yang seeks to dispel the idea that China has a calculated strategy to displace traditional Western players and Japan in the Pacific Islands. To Yang, Beijing’s concerns were more about maintaining a form of international peace that allows China to focus on developing the domestic economic and technological foundations at the heart of modern national power in the global world. Yang believes China lacks the means to challenge Western powers in the Pacific Islands, and that it is also not in China’s interests to do so.

A Taiwanese perspective has been offered by Tamkang University academic Juo-Yu Lin. Her recent review of Taiwanese policy and diplomatic history in the Pacific islands fills a large gap in the literature, and is one of the few analyses of Taiwan’s role in this region that has published by a Taiwanese.31 Lin traces Taiwan’s relations with each of its Pacific Island allies since its division from the mainland in 1949. She reveals troubled bilateral relationships involving threats to change allegiance to China with all but Belau (Palau). This leads her to conclude that Taiwan needs to devote greater effort to gaining recognition and membership of regional and international multilateral organisations through more systematic and transparent relations with its Pacific partners.32 She notes the crucial nature of US support for Taiwan in acting as a counter to China, but also in aiding its Pacific relations.33 Lin has little discussion about the most appropriate aid Taiwan can supply to its particular partners, but it is worth noting that, with the exception of the Solomon Islands, all are small and largely low-lying island nations with particular needs not necessarily required in larger Pacific nations.

Most recent studies have tended to support the broad findings of Wesley-Smith and Porter’s 2010 collection. These new studies have also expanded into

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28 Edgar A. Porter and Terence Wesley-Smith, ‘Oceania matters’, in Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (eds), *China in Oceania: reshaping the Pacific* (New York 2010), 22. The Washington Consensus is more often portrayed as compliance with good governance requirements such as accountability and transparency, and less as adherence to free market ideas hostile to ‘excessive’ government control of development agendas, national expenditure and business legal frameworks.


30 Yang left academia in 2011 to become a National Party politician in the New Zealand House of Representatives. The National Party is the right-of-centre party in government that advocates smaller government and more privatisation of public assets.


32 Ibid., 67–72.

33 Ibid., 57–60, 67–9. 72.
new fields. China expert Graeme Smith has produced a number of detailed ground-breaking works on the *huayi* in Papua New Guinea. Smith has also co-edited a full special issue of *Pacific Affairs* in mid-2013 on Chinese overseas investment around the globe in which Pacific case studies figure prominently, and another special issue in *Asian Studies Review* on Chinese overseas investment.¹³⁴ Both collections raise serious doubts about the idea that China’s overseas aid and foreign multinational projects are part of a coordinated, government strategy. Instead, these studies reveal that outsourcing by Chinese multinationals led to fragmented efforts. Chinese companies often compete against each other overseas and make decisions based primarily on their commercial imperatives. In 2014, the full findings of a large AusAID-funded programme on the Chinese mine at Ramu in Madang Province in 2010 was published as an edited collection, *Pacific Asian Partnerships in Resource Development*. The 21 authors combine local community and national voices within Papua New Guinea, multiple Chinese perspectives and comparative Pacific Islander, Australasian and Filipino examples of community empowerment in resource management.³⁵

The two collections *China in Oceania* and *Pacific Asian Partnerships in Resource Development* collectively involved over 30 academics. With the exception of Wesley-Smith’s contribution to both works, there was no overlap. Yet, both independently reached broadly similar conclusions in viewing Chinese as less of a destabilising force in the Pacific than had hitherto been asserted, and in viewing Pacific Islanders as astute pursuers of their own interests in dealings with outsiders. *Pacific Asian Partnerships* adds a new dimension in combining local community reactions to the national-level government reactions noted in Wesley-Smith and Porter. Most Papua New Guinea contributors concluded that local communities were more antagonistic to their own national government’s failure to deliver services or provide protection and monitoring in local development projects than they were to Chinese developers, whom they were cautiously watching to see how they acted on the ground. While the China-as-threat school largely focuses on state to state relations, most of the post-2010 studies cited above highlight non-state Chinese actors in the Pacific Islands as the most influential ‘Chinese’ factor. The following survey of the history of Chinese in the Pacific confirms this significant omission from debates over the last decade.³⁶


³⁵ D’Arcy, Matbob and Crowl, *Pacific–Asia Partnerships*.

³⁶ Willmott’s various studies being almost the only exception, along with Chin, ‘Contemporary Chinese community in Papua-New Guinea’. Smith’s recent work on Fuqing migrants in Papua New Guinea adds to this minority tradition as discussed below.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHINESE PACIFIC

The following review of the historical record of old, pre-huayi Chinese in the Pacific reveals a fragmented record of diversity within and between communities, but unified by successful adaptation to local communities, with or without intermarriage. Most studies are community or nation specific. There have been few comparative studies beyond brief surveys by Bill Willmott and Crocombe’s large synthesis.37 There are a number of local histories and local or national histories of Chinese communities across the Pacific, but most are compilations of data gathered rather than academic analysis of specific features or phenomena.38 Notwithstanding scattered dissertations in disciplines such as anthropology, much postgraduate research is still to be done on these older Chinese Pacific communities, especially by researchers with Chinese language skills.39


39 Masters and doctoral theses in disciplines other than history can become historical sources themselves, and often lead to other publications. For instance, Margaret Willson’s doctoral research in anthropology led to several papers and chapters on the Chinese in Papua New Guinea. Margaret Willson, ‘Generous face concepts of trade and personhood among the Papua New Guinea Chinese’, doctoral thesis, London School of Economics (London 1989); Margaret Willson, ‘A
Huashang (traders) were preceded into the Pacific by Chinese working as crew on Western vessels. Their presence has perhaps been underestimated. Further research may reveal more sources to allow investigation of the role of Chinese crew in these compact zones of cultural interaction. Historian David Chappell’s notion of ships as liminal spaces offers tantalising possibilities, especially if the local origin of Chinese crew can be ascertained to allow cultural background to be added. Historian Robert Anthony’s analysis of the cultures of the sea in 19th-century coastal southeast China reveals communities more orientated towards the sea than were the European cultures and communities that built, owned and captained the vessels on which many Chinese shipped out.

Most Pacific history textbooks largely ignore the renewal of Chinese contact with their distant ancestral relatives aboard Western vessels, and assume that Oceania largely evolved demographically and culturally in isolation from Mainland and Island East and Southeast Asia after the ancestors of today’s Pacific Island populations struck southward and eastward into the unknown seas of Island Southeast Asia and the Pacific approximately 50,000 to 3,000 years ago. First Papuan-speaking and later Austronesian-speaking explorers, refugees and colonists have been assumed to have had little subsequent contact with their places of ultimate origin. These ‘homelands’ are now part of the greater Chinese world of Southeast China and Taiwan – and one must remember that prior to Han Chinese expansion into that latter during the late 1500s, Taiwan had been almost exclusively Austronesian speaking. Yet archaeologists such as Peter Bellwood and Hsiao-chun Hung of the Australian National University and Barry Rollet of the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa have established the existence of ongoing seafaring links between Taiwan and the Philippines after these initial voyages of colonisation into the Pacific from Taiwan millennia ago, and have identified trade goods that found their way from Taiwan and Philippines to parts of Micronesia. Two-way voyages in traditional


40 David A. Chappell, Double Ghosts: Oceanian voyagers on Euroamerican Ships (Armonk, NY 1997). Historian Iona Man-Chung of Stony Brook University has been working for some years on Chinese seamen on Western sailing vessels and intends publishing her results in a book-length study entitled In the Interstices of Empire: Chinese transoceanic seafarers and the cross-cultural making of Britain.

41 Robert J. Anthony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea: the world of pirates and seafarers in late imperial south China (Berkeley 2003).

canoes were made between the Caroline Islands and the Philippines in the Spanish era.\(^43\)

The southeast coastal communities of China retained their maritime orientation well after the Austronesian diaspora. While imperial China was unified by political and military power based on the rich agricultural plains of the interior, the southeast resisted inland political powers until the 1500s, and well into the modern era remained a zone of piracy, smuggling and other activities unsanctioned by the state. After the north and south were unified under emperors based in Beijing, Chinese naval and trade orientation stayed orientated to coastal waters in East Asia or Southeast Asia. At the height of Chinese maritime expansion, the great voyages of discovery and diplomacy by Admiral Zheng He between 1405 and 1433 sailed south and then west to the Indian Ocean, although one expedition did sail into present-day eastern Indonesia.\(^44\) Japanese maritime interests remained largely coastal and East Asian in orientation.\(^45\)

Dongyang (the eastern ocean), as the Chinese labelled the Pacific, remained a sea of fable largely unexplored and avoided.\(^46\) The Kuroshio Current that flowed north along Japan’s east coast and then eastward to the Americas did transport a few unlucky fishermen to the present-day British Columbian coast where some

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\(^46\) On the complex and shifting meanings and associations of the term ‘Dongyang’, see Lewis Mayo, ‘Dunhuang studies, Tooyoogaku and Pacific studies: literacy, orality and history in Inner Asia in an age of pelagic empire, c1870–2012’, paper presented at The Past and Present of Inner Asian Studies Workshop, Australian National University, 23–24 March 2012, 12. I am grateful to the author for giving me a copy of this paper.
were enslaved by coastal tribes, as early British expeditions found in the late 18th
century. This powerful current may lie behind the Chinese tale of deterrence that
the eastern ocean was dangerous because a strong current dragged ships into a whirl-
pool in the middle of the ocean. Other tales told of three islands and/or lands to the
east rich in gold, silver, jade and one un-named herb that extended life. Early Chinese
emperors had sent large expeditions with thousands of participants to search for these
lands, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{47} Adventurer Tim Severin sailed a junk across the Pacific to
prove that Chinese at least had the technical and navigational capacity to cross the
Pacific.\textsuperscript{48} In his comprehensive study of Islanders on western vessels, \textit{Double Ghosts}, historian David Chappell notes a Polynesian tradition in which the ancestral figure Hawai’i Loa ‘encountered and recruited people with slanting eyes’.\textsuperscript{49} Meso-American
and West Coast Amerindian traditions are silent on large expeditions from the west
before the arrival of Europeans. It is possible that these tales were enriched with
knowledge of the Americas obtained through trade with Spanish at Manila – the
eastern terminus of the Spanish trans-Pacific trade routes.\textsuperscript{50}

The Spanish nominally controlled much of the Philippines from the late
1500s until their overthrow by American military force in 1899–1900. Manila
served as an access point to China via Chinese traders, who married into local com-
munities over time to become a mestizo elite that carved a place for itself within the
colonial order and dominated post-colonial politics in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{51} An undis-
closed number of Filipino-Chinese crew worked on Spanish galleons between
Spanish Manila and the Spanish colony of the Mariana Islands or across the Pacific
to the port of Acapulco. This galleon trade transported precious metals from the
Americas to a largely Chinese market, and Chinese goods to Europe via Spain’s colo-
nies in the Americas. Chinese Filipinos also formed part of the Spanish garrison and
administrative apparatus in the Marianas. Given the decimation of most early
Chamorro by introduced Eurasian diseases to which they had no resistance, many
contemporary Indigenous Chamorro of Guam and the Northern Marianas carry
some Filipino-Chinese genetic heritage, but do not identify in any way as Chinese.
Discussing the importance of Austronesian links for Taiwan’s diplomatic relations
with the Pacific Islands, Crocombe observed,

\textsuperscript{47} The most comprehensive review of the evidence for Chinese trans-Pacific voyaging is Joseph
Needham and Lu Gwei-Djen, \textit{Trans-Pacific Echoes and Resonances: listening once again} (Singapore
1985). See also Chiao-min Hsieh, ‘Geographical exploration by the Chinese’, in Friis, \textit{The Pacific
Basin}, 87–95.
\textsuperscript{48} Timothy Severin, \textit{The China Voyage: across the Pacific by bamboo raft} (Reading, MA 1994).
\textsuperscript{50} On the trans-Pacific galleon trade see O.H.K. Spate, \textit{The Pacific since Magellan}, vol. 1: \textit{The Spanish
Lake} (Canberra 1979), 85; Donald D. Brand, ‘Geographical exploration by the Spaniards’, in Friis,
\textit{The Pacific Basin}, 109–44. For the impact of the trade on China see Brian Moloughney and Xia
Weizhong, ‘Silver and the fall of the Ming: a reassessment’, \textit{Papers on Far Eastern History}, 40
(1989), 51–78.
\textsuperscript{51} Benedict Anderson, ‘Cacique democracy in the Philippines: origins and dreams’, \textit{New Left Review},
During the past 20 years, social, cultural and political relations [with Pacific Islanders] have begun, based on similarities of language, culture and recent history. It is an interesting example of the politics of history, as Taiwanese Austronesians have closer historical connections with the Philippines than to the Pacific Islands, but emphasize connections to the latter.52

The next wave of Chinese to enter the Pacific Islands came as crew on Western trading vessels from the 1770s to the 1850s, particularly as cooks and carpenters. The search for sandalwood and bêche-de-mer led them to the southwest Pacific where the first known Chinese settlers arrived in the New Hebrides in 1844 and New Caledonia in 1846.53 No descendants of these first settlers reside in these islands today. Rather, the longest unbroken line of Chinese Pacific Islanders derives from the huashang, who arrived shortly after the middle of the 19th century.54 Most of these small Chinese trading communities endured through to the present day through marrying into existing Chinese families or more recent Chinese arrivals. This pattern was not followed in the Cook Islands and Kiribati, where the few resident Chinese traders married local women, and their offspring did not emphasise their Chinese identity, although a few have retained their Chinese language ability.

Chinese indentured labour (huagong) soon followed in the second half of the 19th century. Colonial authorities introduced Chinese labourers to Tahiti and the Marquesas in French Polynesia from 1865, German New Guinea from 1891, German Samoa from 1903 and German controlled Nauru and Banaba from 1906.55 Those going to Tahiti were Hakka, recruited from Swatow and Hong Kong, while the Chinese labourers in New Guinea were from Singapore, Macao and Swatow and probably included Hakka and Cantonese. Those labouring in Nauru, Banaba and Samoa were Cantonese from Macao and Hong Kong. A one-off contingent of Chinese indentured labour was recruited in Macao in 1884 for the nickel mines of New Caledonia, but was not sustained in the wake of cheaper sources of labour elsewhere.56 Chinese labourers were also recruited by German authorities to work in the phosphate mines of Angaur in 1908–1909. This particular recruitment campaign is important for the contrast it demonstrates between labour regulations administered by the British in Hong Kong and Chinese authorities in Swatow. The Deutsche Südsee-Phosphat Company running Angaur operations first tried to recruit from the large and established Hong Kong market, but then

52 Crocombe, ‘The fourth wave’, 23. Exceptions exist. Taiwanese scholar Cheng-Hsien Yang completed his PhD in 2011, entitled “Ethnic groups” existing betwixt and between islands and states – on contemporary imaginations of historical relationships among the Tao from Orchid Island, Taiwan and the Ivatan from Batanes Islands, the Philippines’, doctoral thesis, National Taiwan University (Taipei 2011). I am indebted to Karen Tu of ANU for this information.
54 For a comprehensive overview of the arrival of the first Chinese resident traders and businessmen, see Willmott, ‘Varieties of Chinese experience in the Pacific’, n. 88.
55 Willmott, ‘Chinese contract labour’, 166–70.
shipped the recruits to Swatow to evade British regulations. However, the recruits were then prevented from embarking by Chinese provincial officials, including Western-educated nationalist Lin Shu Fen, who had recently visited German Samoa on an official visit and condemned German treatment of Chinese plantation workers there. Chinese authorities soon after also banned the emigration of Chinese labourers from Kwantung province. This protective stance by government officials provides a dramatic contrast to Smith’s finding of limited support from Chinese government for current Fujing huayi as discussed later, and would make a fascinating comparative study of state–citizen relations in international contexts. Regardless of their origin, those labourers who stayed in the Pacific Islands after their labour contracts expired moved into small-scale family businesses in retailing, market gardening and technical services, funded by savings redirected into family enterprises.

Asian influence in the Pacific Islands increased significantly in the 20th century. Gangwu’s third category, the huaqiao, or sojourner, appeared in the Pacific Islands early in the 20th century and established communities that, as mentioned earlier, often maintained links with the motherland and often included both huashang and huagong. Huaqiao communities developed or expanded in French Polynesia, Western Samoa, Fiji, the New Hebrides, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. These growing Chinese communities also incorporated part-Chinese children of Chinese labourers. The major Chinese organisation in the Pacific at this time was the Guomindang, absent only in the New Hebrides, where a Chinese community organisation was founded instead. The Guomindang was locked in a struggle with the Japanese and also the Chinese communist party in China in this latter part of this inter-war period. The size of the Tahitian Chinese community allowed the development of several Chinese associations with associated Chinese schools. A Chinese school was also established in Fiji in 1936. But perhaps the most marked increase in Asian presence in the Island Pacific was through Japanese imperial expansion in the inter-war years. Japanese Micronesia witnessed massive immigration and settlement from Japan, to equal or exceed the local Indigenous population in places.

Further Japanese expansion during World War II seriously disrupted the Chinese communities in Nauru, New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, either through invasion and occupation or evacuation. Behind the frontlines on the Allied side, however, Chinese traders benefitted from the logistical requirements of millions of Allied servicemen for the American-led counterattack to drive back Japanese forces. Chinese migration into the region slowed in the two decades following the end of the

57 Stewart Firth, ‘German labour policy in Nauru and Angaur, 1906–1914’, Journal of Pacific History, 3 (1978), 44. The actions of the Chinese nationalist officials were generously shared with me by the author in a recent communication. See also Francis X. Hezel and M.L. Berg (eds), Micronesia: winds of change (Agana 1984), 421–3.
60 Coppenrath, Les Chinois de Tahiti, 59–63.
61 Ali, Chinese in Fiji, 153.
Pacific War. Since 1960, Asian influence has gradually risen. Most resident Chinese remained after Pacific colonies became nations in the 1960s and 1970s. The rise of the East Asian Tiger economies from the 1960s started a trend that has made East Asia increasingly important to the global economy, with the small percentage of these import and export flows that involves Pacific Island nations still dwarfing anything before it in the Islands. The expansion of the Chinese economy in the last two decades has already been noted, and influenced the flow of huayi into the Pacific Islands. Crocombe saw no immediate end to this trend, predicting that tourists and goods from Asia would continue to rise and that an increasing amount of the Pacific Islands’ exports would go to Asian markets, extracted and exported largely through Asian companies operating in Pacific Island nations.62

**Approaches and Themes for Future Study**

A number of neglected areas warranting further study are apparent from this brief historical review. Only the Chinese communities in Papua New Guinea and Fiji have been the subject of substantial studies. They provide a valuable resource upon which to build further examinations of specific aspects of these communities or for comparative analysis. Willmott has conducted brief comparative analyses using his training in sociology to highlight the variation in sex ratios and Chinese sub-culture of origin within different Chinese communities in Pacific nations, differences in their interaction with local communities, and the related aspect of degree of cultural coherence over time. With regard to assimilation and cultural/community coherence, there is much merit in conducting detailed surveys of Chinese communities that intermarried into local Pacific Islander communities in New Caledonia, Kiribati, Samoa, Tahiti and the Cook Islands to contrast the better documented Chinese communities in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, where apparently less intermarriage with local Pacific Islander communities occurred. Cohabitation between Chinese men and Pacific Island women before World War II in Western Samoa and Tahiti ensured that the children of such unions were raised in two cultures, because they took part in the Chinese cultural community maintained by their fathers, while interacting with their maternal, Polynesian extended families and norms. However, the small size of the Chinese communities in New Caledonia, Kiribati and the Cook Islands made the inculcation of Chinese values and identity less feasible.63

Studies of the Chinese diaspora into Southeast Asia offers potential analytical frameworks. Thus far, only Wang Gangwu’s typology, outlined earlier and also used here, has been employed by Pacific researchers. In introducing the 1996 edited collection on Chinese in Southeast Asia, *Sojourners and Settlers*, political scientist Jamie Mackie noted the wide spectrum of Chinese experiences in this region, from total integration


into the host societies to coexistence and competition. He noted that ‘Chinese have been pulled towards different identities at various times, as Chinese sojourners abroad, as Westernized colonial subjects, as loyal citizens of their adopted countries, as revolutionary communists or modern multinational capitalists’. William Skinner observed that, while Filipino Chinese integrated to become a mestizo elite, Malaysian and Indonesian Chinese maintained a long-term coexistence with their host societies as discrete communities. He noted that this variation could only be explained by understanding the structure of the Chinese community and its society of origin as well as the historical circumstances of time and place in which it evolved overseas. Most Chinese in Southeast Asia lived in urban areas and in population concentrations greater than those of the Pacific, and these conditions facilitated greater retention of identity in contrast to those of smaller populations of Chinese elsewhere.

Interestingly, Mary Somers Heidhues’s study of the minority of Southeast Asian Chinese who lived in rural settings as fishermen or farmers observed how their lifestyles in these settings matched those of their origin communities in China; in contrast to their urban counterparts, their relatively small numbers in any locality also facilitated greater integration into local communities. She noted that most overseas Chinese initially worked rurally in the primary sector or mining, and only later did some drift to urban settings. Chinese farmers were renowned as agricultural innovators across Southeast Asia and also in the USA. In other words, they made a transition from culturally discrete rural Chinese to intermixed overseas rural Chinese and finally to increasingly urban and discretely overseas Chinese. This transition has not been investigated in detail in the Pacific. Commenting on European and Chinese diasporas in and around the Pacific, historian Tony Reid has observed that, although tensions arose between the Chinese and Europeans because of commercial rivalry and other reasons, the two diaspora communities were in some ways compatible – Europeans came as armed empire-builders backed by their governments, while Chinese settlers relied on networks of kin, expecting and getting little support from Chinese government representatives.

One of the few Pacific studies to adopt a wider-ranging, comparative approach is Smith’s detailed study of hua yi in Papua New Guinea. Most come from Fuqing, an impoverished coastal community in Fujien Province in southeast China, where the history of out-migration is long. For these Fuqing migrants, the central and the local Chinese state are effectively absent from their daily lives. These business

64 Jamie Mackie, ‘Introduction’, in Anthony Reid and Kristine Alilunas Rogers (eds), Sojourners and Settlers: histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese (St Leonards, NSW 1996), xiii.
66 Mary Somers Heidhues, ‘Chinese settlements in rural Southeast Asia: unwritten histories’, in Reid and Rogers, Sojourners and Settlers, 177. See also Sucheng Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: the Chinese in California agriculture, 1860–1910 (Berkeley 1986).
migrants have little contact with the embassy in Port Moresby beyond when they need to renew their passports. As relatively recent residents of Papua New Guinea, the Fuqing migrants have little accumulated capital and tend to set up small retail businesses supplied by predominantly ‘old Chinese’ wholesalers originally from Southeast Asia. The difference between this treatment by the Chinese state and the more protective actions of Chinese officials towards Chinese labourers recruited to work in German Angaur has already been noted. The marginal financial circumstances facing the Fujing migrants in Papua New Guinea may change dramatically in the near future as the ever diminishing number of ‘old Chinese’ creates market gaps as wholesalers for better off Fuqing Chinese to fill, even though the majority still intend to return to Fuqing after making their money in Papua New Guinea. If this outlook is typical, the nature, influence and degree of integration of recent Chinese migrants into Pacific Island societies remains fluid. But it seems likely that, for the foreseeable future, persons of Chinese or part-Chinese ancestry will not disproportionately occupy as many important political and economic roles as did the long-established ‘old Chinese’ in the first decades of independence. Reflecting on this past era, Crocombe noted how

Sir Julius Chan was twice prime minister of PNG, Anote Tong is the current president of Kiribati, Gaston Tong Sang is president of French Polynesia, Jim Ah Koy was minister of finance in Fiji and at least two other heads of Pacific Islands’ governments do not discuss their Chinese heritage.69

It is worth noting, however, that most ‘old Chinese’ descend from Chinese who decided to stay in the Pacific Islands. Over time, local opportunities, or a lack of better opportunities elsewhere, may see a similar merging of affiliation and identity with local Pacific Island hosts communities among huayi.

The most comprehensive model for studying historical interactions between Chinese Pacific Island communities and Pacific Islander and other communities, as well as local environments and contexts is environmental historian Lewis Mayo’s study of the history of Auckland’s Manukau harbour. Mayo was raised in Auckland, the world’s largest Polynesian city, and studied Chinese history. His article skilfully weaves the arrival of waves of Pacific Islander, Asian (including Chinese) and Pakeha (European) migrants to the Manukau area, their cultural heritage and home area context (increasingly imbued with global influences the closer to the present the story becomes). This background influenced their views and uses of the land and harbour. Each group left its mark on the landscape, creating layers of meaning that often require cultural affinity to understand. Each group also adds something to other groups’ world visions, and in so doing adapt their own ways


69 Crocombe, Asia in the Pacific Islands, 90.
and beliefs. Throughout it all, the land endures, forever remoulded by nature and manipulated by humans, but never broken.\textsuperscript{70}

The subject of Chinese assimilation and retention of cultural values begs comparison with the rich corpus of Pacific Studies’ literature on culture contact and adjustment. In his 1981 book on culture contact in Hawaii, \textit{Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities}, anthropologist Marshall Sahlins argues that pre-existing structures of belief shaped Hawaiian reactions to Europeans, while at the same time new elements associated with Europeans modified Islanders’ ways of seeing the world.\textsuperscript{71} What has tended to emerge from attempts to marry structure and event is what historian Nicholas Thomas calls ‘systemic history’ – analysis that is more structure than process.\textsuperscript{72} The idea persists that culture changes round the edges as a result of cultural interaction and changed circumstances, but the core remains intact, changing very gradually if at all. Interestingly, J.W. Davidson had reached similar conclusions a decade before, despite coming from an intellectual tradition that emphasises historical processes over cultural beliefs.\textsuperscript{73} Historian Ian Campbell argues that first encounters were not so much about a clash of mutually unintelligible cultural worldviews, but situations where both sides realized they faced unusual circumstances and resorted to unusual behaviour themselves in an attempt to accommodate these circumstances. What emerged was a third culture, a culture of contact that arose by trial and error as both sides mediated between the two cultures involved.\textsuperscript{74}

There is much merit in using these conceptual frameworks to examine the current impact and integration of \textit{huayi} in the Pacific. Smith and D’Arcy recently asserted that

the Chinese people, the Chinese government and Chinese corporations are not monolithic entities; they represent a diverse range of interests, views and values that are shaped by their interaction with other countries. Their actions are shaped by Chinese domestic considerations, and by the legal, cultural and social norms of the host country … While values and norms may be challenged by exposure to new environments, there is no reason to assume that a fundamental shift in interests and identities occurs as soon as Chinese actors move offshore, particularly those actors who are accustomed to acting as ‘norm-makers’ in the domestic

\textsuperscript{72} Nicholas Thomas, \textit{Out of Time: history and evolution in anthropological discourse} (2nd edn, Ann Arbor 1996), 96.
context.\(^75\) The shift towards ‘localization’,\(^76\) or ‘building congruence with local norms’ is never straightforward, with obstacles of language, culture, and perceptions to be negotiated.\(^77\)

Pacific historians have only partly integrated ‘Asian’ influences into Pacific regional histories, and even less so in national histories. The one exception is Brij Lal’s general histories of Fiji, in which the Fijian Indian population figures prominently alongside the ethnic Fijian population.\(^78\) In terms of regional histories, Clive Moore’s history of Papua New Guinea and Pamela Swadling’s Plumes from Paradise have linked Melanesia and Island Southeast Asia through tracing trade exchanges in particular, while Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard’s Foreign Bodies reminded us of the conceptual unity seen between the Malay and Pacific worlds by earlier generations of scholars.\(^79\) The most comprehensive attempt to integrate Asian influences into Pacific histories is Matt Matsuda’s 2012 book Pacific Worlds, which argues for extending our conceptualization of the Pacific further west to better reflect the fluidity and range of influences flowing between Asia and the Western Pacific. Movements of Filipino, and to a lesser extent Chinese and Japanese, migrant labourers are combined with the histories of colonial plantation economies such as Hawaii’s. Matsuda notes that

Oceania, Europe, the Americas, and Asia all have crossed, and continue to act, struggle, and create in these islands. The palm-fringed shores are marked by overlapping histories and reminders: rusting artillery fortifications, tinned fish, Japanese electronics and motorbikes, pandanus baskets, Sunday mass, dubbed television, dances to honor the frigate bird, ancient outriggers. The Pacific brings and takes them all.\(^80\)

Another aspect of Chinese community identity in the Pacific that merits greater attention is how the sub-national cultural and linguistic mix of the Chinese

\(^79\) Clive Moore, New Guinea: crossing boundaries and history (Honolulu 2003), chs 2–3; Pamela Swadling, Plumes from Paradise: trade cycles in outer Southeast Asia and their impact on New Guinea and nearby islands until 1920 (Boroko 1996); Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard (eds), Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the science of race 1750–1940 (Canberra 2008).
\(^80\) Matt Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: a history of seas, peoples, and cultures (Cambridge, UK 2012), 378.
community affected group and family identity. Does being a small fragmented group in a foreign land lead members to seek belonging and security in a collective ‘Chinese’ identity or to retreat to the mainstays of Chinese life, family and local community? Many of the early Chinese traders to come to the Pacific Islands were Hokkien people, who shipped out from the port of Xiamen in Fujien Province — and Smith has shown that most of Papua New Guinea’s recent huayi not only come from Fujien, but from one village in Fujien. But by 1900, Cantonese migrants had replaced Hokkien as the predominant migrant Chinese in the Pacific Islands. The Cantonese language dominates in Chinese communities in the Pacific, apart from Tahiti, where Hakka is spoken because of the large percentage of Hakka-speaking labourers recruited to Tahiti, many of whom later migrated to New Caledonia to form the other Hakka-speaking Chinese enclave in the Pacific. Willmott notes that the recent rapid expansion of Chinese in the Pacific has made the Chinese community not only larger, but also more linguistically diverse.81

Fluency in spoken Chinese variants used in the Pacific or partnerships with Chinese collaborators are required to comprehensively undertake studies of these Chinese community and their links back to communities of origin in China. At present only a handful of Pacific Island-focused scholars have the linguistic ability and cultural understanding to move freely within and between Chinese and Pacific Island communities.82 Until more Pacific academics are able to bridge this divide, the potential for collaboration between Pacific specialists and Pacific specialists in East Asia remains untapped.

The latter are admittedly few. Pacific-focused academics remain rare in China and Taiwan, despite a long-established Centre for Pacific Studies at National Taiwan University.83 The main Pacific experts in Taiwan are Professor Yuan-chao Tung of the Department of Anthropology at National Taiwan University, who studies diaspora and migration in the Pacific, especially the neglected subject of Chinese in Tahiti, as well as population movement in Marshall Islands, and Pei-yi Guo of Academia Sinica’s Institute of Ethnology, who studies the Solomon Islands. Futuru Tsai of National Taitung University is a member of the Amis tribe of eastern Taiwan who studies Taiwanese Austronesian soldiers in the Pacific during World War II.84 Despite the fact that China’s eight embassies have more diplomatic

82 The above-mentioned Graeme Smith, Lewis Mayo, Yuan-chao Tung, Pei-yi Guo and Denghua Zhang, the last of whom worked for the Chinese government in the Pacific before resigning to pursue an academic career focused on contemporary Chinese–Pacific interactions.
84 Futuru Tsai is also a film maker. National Taitung University is the main university for Indigenous studies in Taiwan. He has visited the Angoram area of the Sepik region of Papua New Guinea to trace the history of Austronesian Taiwanese who served in the Japanese armed forces during World War II — see Malum Nalu, ‘Group ritual brings back WWII spirits’, The National, 11 Sept. 2013. Available at: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/666/139719/7107a75-7e81-
staff than any other nation in the Islands, no training or course is currently offered on the Pacific in China, and there are few Pacific-focused researchers. There are three focal points for Pacific Studies in China. Professor Yu Changsen heads the Centre for Oceania Studies at Sun Yat Sen University in Guangzhou, assisted by Dr Fei Sheng. Changsen is conducting research on Chinese activities in Papua New Guinea, while Sheng has an interest in environmental issues in the Pacific. The Centre also has a strong interest in Pacific international relations. The second focal point is Peking University’s recently formed Pacific Studies Centre, headed by internationally renowned environmental historian Professor Bao Maohong. The third focal point is the Research Centre for the Pacific Island Nations at Liaocheng University, which was established in September 2012. The Research Centre is headed by environmental historian Professor Lyu Guixia, who is currently focusing her work on contemporary Fiji.

Pacific Island scholars also have important contributions to make to Chinese Studies in terms of the comparative perspectives they can provide on China’s overseas aid and business practices, Chinese diaspora, and the prospects of a more multicultural future within parts of the Chinese world, and within Taiwan in particular. Mining and development expert Glenn Banks from Massey University argues that the pattern of business and government working closely together in Papua New Guinea demonstrates great continuity between contemporary Chinese and earlier Australian operations. In all instances, local communities feel excluded, as companies and governments fail to engage, cooperate with, and win over local communities directly affected by mining and forestry operations. This lack of engagement inevitably results in erosive tensions that curtail and can even halt commercial operations. Banks notes that the troubles confronting the Chinese management team of MCC Ramu Nico Limited in this first decade of its operation also characterised the first decade of earlier, Western mining company operations in Papua New Guinea. For example, accusations that MCC has been able to use connections within the national government to bring legal pressure to bear against local communities protesting against mine construction resemble accusations made against the Australian mining company BHP in 1995. While it is still early days, it is worth noting that MCC has avoided the armed conflict and massive environmental damage that characterised the first decade of operation for Panguna and Ok Tedi mines respectively. The lessons of past mining operations suggest that, if MCC operations are to remain profitable and free from disruption by legal battles, passive resistance or open conflict, MCC will need to engage more with local communities in a genuine two-way dialogue, and meet their needs before these
become inflexible demands, hardened by perceived marginalisation from decision-making processes. 86

Taiwan’s attempts to forge a new identity distinct from the mainland in the 1990s marked an uneasy time for Taiwan, as no master historical narrative could unify and accommodate the diversity of Taiwan’s component communities: majority Hoklo, minority Aboriginal Austronesian-speaking tribes, Hakka and post-war refugees deemed ‘Mainlanders’. Researchers have delved deeper and deeper into Taiwan’s past to differentiate the island from the Mainland – by emphasising its Austronesian roots and ocean-orientated international connections with Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese traders, residents and colonisers. Taiwan’s Aboriginal peoples now have greater recognition within Taiwan, but still remain an economically and politically marginalised minority concentrated in the island’s southeast. Fourteen ethnic groups are recognised as Aboriginal by the Taiwanese government, and their cultural links to the Pacific are seen as an important asset in foreign policy. They number around 538,994, which is just over 2% of Taiwan’s total population of 23,245,000 people. 87 That diversity is increasing rapidly as large numbers of Taiwanese males marry foreigners, especially from China, Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand. The next generation of Taiwan’s population will need to adjust, celebrate and recognise this diversity or risk being fragmented by it. 88

Taiwan and other parts of the Chinese world also need to understand better the processes that Chinese overseas have experienced in order to understand better how to accommodate new migrants and new diversity. As well as exploring lacunae already noted in this section, there is merit in conducting comparative studies of other Pacific diaspora to understand what makes Chinese interactions with other communities unique. The largest body of such literature concerns the Indian diaspora and includes several reflections by Indian scholars on key differences between communities of the Indian and Chinese global diaspora. Lal has observed how 19th-century Chinese labourers were less regulated than those from India, and more willing to


leave plantations and seek other professions as soon as they were eligible; they also responded to opportunities to integrate into host communities more readily than their Indian counterparts. Lal notes that religious beliefs and the larger size of Indian diaspora communities compared with those from the Chinese world militated against greater integration with local communities. In the case of Fiji, British colonial policy further blocked Indian integration, ostensibly to allow Fijians space to maintain their culture and engage with the outside world on their own terms. Lal notes that religious beliefs and the larger size of Indian diaspora communities compared with those from the Chinese world militated against greater integration with local communities. In the case of Fiji, British colonial policy further blocked Indian integration, ostensibly to allow Fijians space to maintain their culture and engage with the outside world on their own terms. Lal notes that religious beliefs and the larger size of Indian diaspora communities compared with those from the Chinese world militated against greater integration with local communities. In the case of Fiji, British colonial policy further blocked Indian integration, ostensibly to allow Fijians space to maintain their culture and engage with the outside world on their own terms.89 Indian diaspora and world history scholar Sucheta Mazumdar has called for ‘a regional-global model of Chinese and Indian migration history that draws on the local specificities of the various regions of the world to which the peoples migrated’ in order to ‘place Chinese and Indian migrations in comparative perspective within a framework of global capitalism that underpins the trajectories and specific histories of these migrations in the modern world’.

There are many Chinese Pacifics. All are under-studied, and all are transforming and interacting with a variety of global and local influences. These features are shared by many ethnic, cultural and national communities in the Pacific Islands. The value of comparative studies as a way of illuminating the history of Chinese communities in the Pacific Islands has been heavily emphasised in this survey. While lacunae need investigation, it is also important to affirm the imperative for comprehensive, multidisciplinary approaches. Chinese communities must be placed in wider thematic contexts, as outlined by Crocombe in *Asia in the Pacific Islands*. Future research must continue to blend state and non-state worlds, and explore the interactions and historical trajectories detailed by scholars such as Mayo, Smith and Wilmott. Greater attention must be given to the diverse and specific histories of myriad Chinese communities, business interests and government activities, from provision of CCTV coverage to medical aid. And greater attention must be given to the ‘Chinese’ initiatives of Pacific Islanders. Such scholarship will enrich Pacific Studies and move us towards hidden histories of belonging. These can frame Chinese in the Pacific as neither threat nor opportunity, but rather a misunderstood and evolving reality.