Head of School: Associate Professor Jack Robles
Teaching in 2017
- as Course Coordinator and Lecturer
Jack's Personal Homepage
BA University of California Berkeley, PhD University of California San Diego
Game Theory and Economic Theory, Current research: rationality in extensive form games, evolutionary stability in bargaining situations, discrimination (in group bias: as a repeated game equilibrium, and contacts between lawyers and clients).
- 'Demand growth and strategically useful idle capacity', Oxford Economic Papers, 63, 4 (2011), pp. 767-786.
- 'The evolution of parental investment: Re-examining the anisogamy argument' (with Tore Ellingsen) Journal of Theoretical Biology, published online (2011), DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.031.
- 'Stochastic stability in finitely repeated two player games', The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Article 10 (Topics) 11 (2011).
- 'Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences', Economic Theory, 35 (2008), pp.19-36.
- 'Product innovation and parallel trade' (with Changying Li), The International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25 (2007), pp. 417-429.
- 'Issue linking in trade negotiations: Ricardo revisited or no pain no gain' (with Ignatius Horstman and Jim Markusen), The Review of International Economics, 13 (2005), pp. 185-204.
- 'Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?'(with Tore Ellingsen), Games and Economic Behavior, 39 (2002), pp. 28-53.
- 'Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games', Games and Economic Behavior, 34 (2001), pp. 312-330.
- 'Evolution with changing mutation rates', Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), pp.192-207.
- 'Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies', Journal of Economic Theory, 75 (1997), pp. 180-193.