Russian objectives in Ukraine

The following commentary is provided by Dr Alexander Maxwell, a senior lecturer in History at Victoria University of Wellington.

Ukranian flag

Vladimir Putin recently caused a minor scandal by declaring that the Russian army could take the Ukrainian capital Kyiv “in two weeks”. Such threatening talk attracted general condemnation, though Russia Today reported that Putin’s comments had been taken out of context. Nevertheless, the war in eastern Ukraine is frightening, not least because it may escalate unpredictably. Russia is sending weapons, tanks and soldiers to the leaders of a separatist movement in Ukrainian provinces Donetsk and Luhansk. The separatist leaders have proclaimed an independent Donetsk People’s Republic whose forces have, with Russian support, so far proved a match for the regular Ukrainian army. What does Russia hope to achieve by supporting the separatist movement in eastern Ukraine?

One of the most striking things about Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine is that Russia has consistently denied intervening in the region. When Russian anti-aircraft batteries shot down Ukrainian fighter jets, Russia denied involvement. When Russian tanks crossed the border to fight with separatist forces, the Russian foreign ministry denied involvement. When Ukrainian forces captured Russian soldiers, the Russian government claimed they had crossed the border “by accident”.

Russian denial about eastern Ukraine contrasts strikingly with Russia’s stance toward Crimea. Russia initially concealed its support for separatists in Crimea, letting local proxies act in its place. Russian proxies organised a patently dishonest referendum, in which Crimean voters were not even given the option of maintaining the status quo in Ukraine. The bogus referendum results nevertheless served to justify Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March. Russian proxies in Donetsk and Luhansk have also organised bogus referendums, yet Russia has not, so far, made any move to annex Donetsk or Luhansk. The difference in approach suggests different ambitions.

If Russia does not want to annex eastern Ukraine outright, what does it want? On 14 May, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov proposed that Ukraine accept “decentralisation, federalisation, whatever you call it”. The former communist world contains other breakaway states that set a precedent. In 1990, as the Soviet Union collapsed, ethnic Russians established the Republic of Transnistria in northern Moldova. No United Nation member states recognise Transnistria, but it otherwise functions as an independent state. The Republic of Georgia has similarly lost control over two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. When Georgian troops attempted to assert control over these territories in 2008, the Russian army intervened, and punished Georgia by recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. It seems Russia wants the Donetsk People’s Republic to join the ranks of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Ukraine would not need to recognise the formal independence of the new state, but would have to acknowledge its independence in practice.

Putin may also calculate that a low-level war in Ukraine serves his own political interests. The protest movement that toppled the corrupt government of Viktor Yanukovych in February might encourage similar protests in Russia. Putin may seek to humiliate the new Ukrainian government in order to intimidate potential domestic rivals.

Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko faces two unattractive options. First, he could negotiate a peace deal with the Donetsk People’s Republic. Recognising its autonomy would not only mean a second humiliating loss of Ukrainian territory, but may also encourage further separatism elsewhere in Ukraine.

Second, Poroshenko can fight a war with Russia. Ukraine cannot hope to defeat the Russian army in open battle: in case of all-out war, the Russian army might not need two weeks to reach Kyiv. On the other hand, conquering Ukraine is not the same as pacifying it. Putin is probably too canny to risk a protracted occupation of Ukraine. After the Second World War, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army fielded soldiers against the Red Army as late as 1956. So how far is Russia prepared to go to support the Donetsk People’s Republic? If Poroshenko decides to find out, the war in Ukraine could become a very serious affair.

While the United States and the European Union have no particular interest in Donetsk or Luhansk, they are right to respond to Russia’s actions. As a counter-weight to Russian power, NATO has recently announced that it will create a ‘spearhead force’ based in Romania, Poland and the Baltic states. It’s hard to say which precedent is more alarming: the outright annexation of Crimea, or the strategy of fomenting civil war to encourage breakaway movements.

Photo credit: Mstyslav Chernov